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I. INTRODUCTION
In Europe, a growing chorus of voices is complaining about an E.U.
copyright framework that falls short of the needs of modern information
society. Despite all the aspirations and hopes that were associated with
the recent E.U. copyright reform, 1 by now it is clear that the
modernization of the legal framework will be much less ambitious than
expected. 2 Certain aspects of the legislative initiative might even have the
potential to further compromise an already disturbed balance between
the far-reaching rights of copyright holders and the needs of the public
to access cultural and informational content on fair terms and in a
technology-friendly environment. 3
1. Christophe Geiger et al., The Resolution of the European Parliament of 9 July 2015:
Paving the Way (Finally) for a Copyright Reform in the European Union?, 37 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 683, 683–84 (2015).
2. See Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, & Oleksandr Bulayenko, The EU
Commission’s Proposal to Reform Copyright Limitations: A Good but Far Too Timid Step in the
Right Direction, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 4, 4–6 (2018).
3. See, e.g., General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package, EUR. COPYRIGHT
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One of the major problems commonly highlighted in this regard is the
problem of imbalances – in other words, a narrow space the E.U.
copyright law leaves to the so-called exceptions and limitations (E&Ls)
to exclusive rights – the mechanisms inherent to copyright law aimed at
ensuring that the sufficient breathing space is secured for future creativity
and cultural exchanges. 4 As it was deplored by a vast number of
scholars, 5 the 2001 E.U. Copyright Directive (also known as InfoSoc) 6
defines exclusive rights broadly, while the copyright exceptions are made
narrow, optional, exhaustive, and are further subjected to the so-called
international “three-step test.” 7 If wrongly applied, the latter can
SOC’Y
4–5
(Jan.
24,
2017),
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinionon-eu-copyright-reform-def.pdf; General Remarks, in MODERNISATION OF THE EU
COPYRIGHT RULES, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
18 (Reto M. Hilty & Valentina Moscon eds., 2017); Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo
Frosio, & Oleksandr Bulayenko, The Introduction of a Neighbouring Right for Press Publisher
at E.U. Level: the Unneeded (and Unwanted) Reform, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 202, 20406 (2017) [hereinafter Geiger, Frosio, & Bulayenko, The Unneeded (and Unwanted) Reform].
4. Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on
the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010). See
generally Francisco Javier Cabrera Blázquez et al., Eur. Audiovisual Observatory,
Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright (2017) (providing a recent overview of the state of
exceptions and limitations in the E.U.).
5. See Jonathan Griffiths et al., Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements of the Legal
Framework for Copyright in the European Union – Opinion on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case
C-201/13 Deckmyn, 45 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 127 (2015); Christophe Geiger &
Franciska Schönherr, Limitations to Copyright in the Digital Age, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON E.U. INTERNET LAW 110 (Andrej Savin & Jan Trzaskowski eds., 2014); Christophe
Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, Defining the Scope of Protection of Copyright in the EU: The
Need to Reconsider the Acquis Regarding Limitations and Exceptions, in CODIFICATION OF
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 133 (Tatiana–Helene
Synodinou ed., 2012) [hereinafter Geiger & Schönherr, Defining the Scope of Protection of
Copyright in the EU].
6. Council Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright
and related rights in the information society (InfoSoc), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2),
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (providing laws on the
right of reproduction); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Annex 1C, Part II, art. 13, Jan. 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing laws for all
exclusive rights); World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art. 10,
Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, 155; World Intellectual Property Organization
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, 251.
See Christophe Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais, and Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test
Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
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additionally narrow down an already small room for possible derogations
from copyright protection. 8 The European legislature’s approach
towards the narrow construction of copyright exceptions was further
endorsed by the Court of Justice of the E.U. (C.J.E.U.), which has been
repeatedly stating since its Infopaq decision that any exception to the
general rule of copyright protection should be interpreted strictly. 9
Finally, thereby attenuated exceptions can additionally be constrained by
contract or application of the Technological Protection Measures
(T.P.M.). 10
Apart from the general problem of imbalances, another hurdle of E.U.
copyright framework that naturally stems from the first problem is the
copyright system’s lack of flexibility. 11 As just mentioned, the current
581 (2014).
8. The E.U. incorporation of the test in Article 5(5) InfoSoc requires that any
exception to copyright should meet the following criteria: 1) it should be introduced in
certain special cases 2) that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
that 3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder. See
Christophe Geiger, From Berne to National Law, via the Copyright Directive: The Dangerous
Mutations of the Three–Step Test, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 486 (2007) (discussing the
potential dangers of a wrong use of the three-step test as a restrictive mechanism for
copyright limitations); Jonathan Griffiths, The ‘Three-Step Test’ in European Copyright Law
– Problems and Solutions, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 428 (2009).
9. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] ECR, I-06569,
¶ 56. See also Case C-435/12, ACI Adam BV and Others v. Stichting de Thuiskope, 2014
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 22 (Apr. 10, 2014). It has to be noted, however, that in
recent years the Court of Justice took a more liberal stance, relying on a purposive
interpretation of exceptions in light of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Case C-403/08
Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v. QC Leisure, [2011] ECR, I–09083, ¶
163; Case C-429/08, Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd, [2011] ECR, I-09083,
¶ 163; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] ECR, I-12533
¶¶ 132–33; Case C-201/13, Deckmyn et al. v. Vandersteen et al., 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS ¶¶ 19–23 (Sept. 3, 2014); Case C-117/13, Technische Universität Darmstadt v. Eugen
Ulmer KG, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 27, 31 (Sept. 11, 2014). See Christophe
Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Harmonizing, Creating, and
Sometimes Disrupting Copyright Law in the European Union, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN E.U.
AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 435 (I. Stamatoudi ed., 2016) (discussing these
different and sometimes contradicting approaches).
10. Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece – the Liberation of European Copyright
Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. AND ELEC. COM. L. 87, 87–88 (2010)
[hereinafter Unsticking the Centre–Piece].
11. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of
Flexibilities
1,
7
(Nov.
2011),
https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/2943008/Fair+Use+in+Europe+In+Se
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E.U. copyright framework defines copyright exceptions in a closed
catalogue that does not allow, except in minor deviations, for the
addition of any “free spaces,” which have not been envisaged by the
legislature at the time of the Directive’s construction. 12 As commonly
observed, this arrangement gives rise to a certain rigidity of the system. 13
This rigidity is further exacerbated by the pace of development of the
modern information society. 14 In the light of rapidly evolving
technologies, legislative amendments need to be introduced all the time
to keep up with the fast-changing realities. 15 An extremely slow legislative
cycle in the E.U. coupled with the need to further transpose the Union
legislation domestically only adds to this initial lack of flexibility, making
the closed construction of the E.U. system of copyright limitations highly
unpractical. 16
Beside imbalances and rigidity, there is yet another disadvantage of the
E.U. copyright framework – the lack of legal certainty. Unlike the lack of
flexibility, this drawback is rarely named as a characteristic feature of the
civil law copyright tradition and is more frequently associated with the
common law world. Legal uncertainty in E.U. copyright acquis persists
for several reasons, including the fact that only one InfoSoc exception 17
is obligatory for all E.U. Members who are thus free to choose which
exceptions they decide to transpose domestically. 18 Furthermore, the
arch+of+Flexibilities.pdf [hereinafter Fair Use in Europe].
12. See, e.g., Martin Senftleben, Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in Intellectual
Property Law – The Need for Horizontal Fair Use Defences, in THE STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 136, 142 (Annette Kur &
Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011) [hereinafter Overprotection and Protection Overlaps].
13. See id. at 140–41.
14. Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece, supra note 10, at 90.
15. See Geiger, Frosio, and Bulayenko, The Unneeded (and Unwanted) Reform, supra
note 3, at 204–05.
16. Hugenholtz & Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe, supra note 11, at 7; Senftleben,
Overprotection and Protection Overlaps, supra note 12, at 155; Christophe Geiger, Flexibilising
Copyright – Remedies to the Privatisation of Information by Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 178 (2008). It has to be noted, however, that the
current wording of some of the limitations and exceptions of the InfoSoc have certainly
some further potential for a flexible interpretation, for example the quotation exception
of Art. 5.3(d) allowing quotations if the “use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the
extent required by the specific purpose” (emphasis added). See Geiger & Schönherr, Defining
the Scope of Protection of Copyright in the E.U., supra note 5, at 133.
17. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
18. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 6, art. 5(2)–6(4).
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manner in which the Member States implement even the very same
exceptions can vary considerably from country to country. 19 Finally, the
subjection of InfoSoc’s list of exceptions to the three-step test does not
add to the legal certainty when it comes to the question of which uses
are permitted and which should be deemed infringing across the E.U. 20
Summing up, the E.U. system of exceptions and limitations appears to
be in quite an unfavorable situation – one that Martin Senftleben aptly
characterized as an “E.U. worst case scenario” – “a copyright system [ . . .
] that offers neither legal certainty [that could have been expected from
the civil law legal tradition] nor sufficient flexibility [commonly found in
the common law legal systems].” 21
As a response to the above-sketched problems of E.U. copyright
(imbalances, lack of flexibility, and legal uncertainty), several ways to fix
the system and to re-establish the original balance between exclusive
rights and permissible derogations from them 22 have been suggested. 23
One of the recurring proposals is the introduction of the so-called “fair
use” copyright exception into the E.U. legal framework. 24
Fair use is a distinctive feature of the U.S. legal tradition, which unlike
that of the civil law countries (and hence largely of the E.U. itself), allows
for a much greater flexibility in approaching exceptions and limitations
to copyright law. 25 American fair use (codified in Section 107 of the U.S.

19. For example, a quotation exception has very different scope across Europe. See
also Hugenholtz & Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe, supra note 11, at 15-17; Christophe
Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, Eur. Union Intell. Prop. Off., Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQ) of Consumers in Relation to Copyright, SUMMARY REPORT 6–8 (2017) (“Copyright
law throughout the E.U. does not give unanimous answers to Consumers’ 15
Frequently Asked Questions . . . [t]he result is the following; even if a few common
basic principles can certainly be identified, the exceptions to these principles as well as
their implementation vary significantly.”). The study lists exceptions and limitations to
copyright as one of the areas of major divergence in national copyright law.
20. See Senftleben, Overprotection and Protection Overlaps, supra note 12, at 152–53.
21. Id. at 156, 157.
22. See Alain Strowel, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES ET
CONVERGENCES. ÉTUDE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 149 (1993) (discussing how copyright
law in civil law countries has lost its flexibility during the 20th century).
23. See Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre–Piece, supra note 10, at 89–90.
24. See id. at 90–91.
25. See generally, Pierre N. Leval, Commentaries, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (discussing further U.S. fair use standards).
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Copyright Act 26) exists as a superstructure to the legislatively defined
exceptions to copyright. It keeps the system open and permits, through
the application of judicially developed fairness factors, for additional uses
to be characterized as “fair,” and thus non-infringing, even if those uses
are not explicitly defined by the statute. Fair use is widely praised for its
ability to adapt to new social developments, including technological
changes, which cannot be envisaged by the legislature or to which the
legislature is not able to react swiftly. 27
Despite its numerous advantages, a blind transposition of U.S. fair use
on European ground has been historically strongly opposed in the E.U. 28
This is for many good reasons, ranging from the different philosophical
foundations on which the common and civil law copyright traditions are
built to the lack of legal certainty, a commonly named flip side of the
openness and flexibility that U.S. fair use suggests. 29 In his recent opinion
on the Spiegel Online case, the Advocate General of the C.J.E.U. has
further considered that introduction of a sort of “fair use” clause into
E.U. law would “transform[] any harmonization effort into wishful
thinking.” 30 Finally, the fact that fair use is always the use for free (i.e. no
26. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2019).
27. See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Globalizing User Rights–Talk: On Copyright Limits and
Rhetorical Risks, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 27 (2017); Senftleben, Overprotection and
Protection Overlaps, supra note 12, at 155; Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural
Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 384
(2005); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275,
332-33, 340 (1989).
28. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright, Can E.U. Author’s Right Accommodate
Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 275, 276–
77 (Ruth Okediji ed., 2016) (providing a brief overview of the history of the fair use
proposals in Europe).
29. In recent times, critics have convincingly challenged this assumption, suggesting
that the fair use defense as it is applied by U.S. courts provides more legal security than
it is sometimes assumed. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 47,
48–49 (2012); Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 27, at 2540; Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 740-43 (2011); Martin
Senftleben, Bridging the Differences between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – The Emerging EC
Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 521, 530–32 (2010); Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 549, 575–81 (2008).
30. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH
v. Beck, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 63 (Jan. 10, 2019). See, e.g., Tito Rendas,
Advocate General Szpunar in Spiegel Online (or Why We Need Fair Use in the EU), 14 J. INTELL.
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remuneration is paid to the rightholders in case one particular use is ruled
fair) can be viewed as a disadvantage of this solution, 31 as the limitationsbased remunerations can secure significant revenues for creators and can
thus be considered important features of the copyright balances in
author-centered legislative frameworks. 32
The literal transposition of the U.S. fair use has not, however, been
viewed as the only way of opening up the E.U. copyright system. Over
the years, a number of viable solutions were advanced in the literature to
this end. Among the most developed is the proposal of keeping the best
of two worlds by retaining the precisely defined list of exceptions based
on the model of InfoSoc. 33 However, instead of delimiting the list of
exceptions even further by virtue of the application of the three-step test,
the proposal suggests using this same test in an enabling manner34 – that
PROP. L. & PRAC. 265 (2019); Tatiana Synodinou, Mirror, Mirror, Tell Me, is the Copyright
Law Fair and Balanced? Reflection on AG’s Conclusions on the Spiegel Online Case Part I,
KLUWER
COPYRIGHT
BLOG
(Feb.
15,
2019),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/02/15/mirror-mirror-tell-me-is-thecopyright-law-fair-and-balanced-reflection-on-ags-conclusions-on-the-spiegel-onlinecase-part-i/; Tatiana Synodinou, Mirror, Mirror, Tell Me, is the Copyright Law Fair and
Balanced? Reflection on AG’s Conclusions on the Spiegel Online Case (Part II), KLUWER
COPYRIGHT
BLOG
(Feb.
21,
2019),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/02/21/mirror-mirror-tell-me-is-thecopyright-law-fair-and-balanced-reflection-on-ags-conclusions-on-the-spiegel-onlinecase-part-ii/.
31. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted–but–Paid?, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (“Fair use is an on/off switch; either the challenged use
is an infringement of copyright or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares ‘is not an
infringement of copyright.’ As a result, either the copyright owner can stop the use, or
the user is not only dispensed from obtaining permission, but also owes no
compensation for the use.”).
32. See, e.g., Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, supra note 4, at
528–30; see Christophe Geiger, Statutory Licenses as Enabler of Creative Uses, in
REMUNERATION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS, REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF NEW
BUSINESS MODELS 305, 308-09 (Kung–Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2017).
33. See, e.g., Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, supra note 4, at
527–33 (delineating one alternative as used in Germany).
34. See Martin Senftleben, The International Three–Step Test: A Model Provision for EC
Fair Use Legislation, J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E–COM. L. 67 (2010) [hereinafter
Senftleben, The International Three–Step Test]; Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Three–Step
Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the Information Society, U.N. EDUC., SCI. &
CULTURAL ORG. E–COPYRIGHT BULL. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Geiger, The Role of the
Three–Step Test], https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000157848; see also
Christophe Geiger, Implementing an International Instrument for Interpreting Copyright
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is to say, as a test applied not to an already enumerated list of exceptions
(the way it functions now) but as a threshold for the introduction of new
exceptions to copyright. One of the embodiments of this proposal, a
draft European Copyright Code advanced by Wittem Group, 35 further
distinguishes between the “free-of-charge” exceptions and those which
can only be granted subject to fair remuneration to rightholders. 36
A much less researched solution is to look at the model of flexibility
that already exists in European law, notably at the test of proportionality,
which represents a distinguished feature of the European human rights
law. 37 This test is inherent to any qualified human right, such as the right
to privacy, freedom of expression and information, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, or freedom of assembly. 38 In application to each
of these rights, the test of proportionality has a rich set of balancing
factors developed within the years of the European human rights law
construction by judges of the European Court of Human Rights

Limitations and Exceptions, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 627 (2009);
Kamiel J. Koelman, Fixing the Three–Step Test, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 407 (2006).
See generally Christophe Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais, and Martin Senftleben, Understanding
the “Three–Step Test”, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 167 (D. Gervais ed., 2015).
35. European copyright code, THE WITTEM PROJECT (April 2010),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21_a
pril_2010.pdf.
36. Id. at 23-27.
37. See generally Jonas Christoffersen, Human Rights and Balancing: The Principle of
Proportionality, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 19 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); see Orit Fischman Afori, Proportionality - A
New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 889 (2014) (discussing the role of the proportionality test in its
application to copyright law in Europe); Caterina Sganga & Silvia Scalzini, From Abuse
of Right to European Copyright Misuse: A New Doctrine for E.U. Copyright Law, 48 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1 (2017); Peter Teunissen, The Balance Puzzle:
The ECJ’s Method of Proportionality Review for Copyright Injunctions, 40(9) EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 579 (2018).
38. See Peggy Ducoulombier, Interaction Between Human Rights: Are All Human Rights
Equal?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
39 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) (discussing the hierarchy of human rights).
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(E.Ct.H.R. or Strasbourg Court), 39 C.J.E.U., 40 and national courts. 41
Considering that copyright law is, in essence, the law regulating
expression and information flows, the question arises whether the
proportionality inbuilt in the right to freedom of expression (FoE)
suggests a viable model of flexibility that can be successfully applied to
E.U. copyright, thereby serving as a European alternative to U.S. fair
use. 42
This article is devoted to exploring this exact aspect of the issue. As
will be demonstrated, the growing application of freedom of expression
and information to copyright disputes in many E.U. countries makes
“fair use” already a reality in the entirety of Europe. It is important to
note at this stage that the term “fair use” is applied here to relate to the
open-ended construction of copyright limitations. The term therefore
should not be equated with U.S. fair use and is put in quotes throughout
this article with the aim of highlighting the conventionality of its use.
39. See generally Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the
European Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 9
(Christophe Geiger, et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Geiger & Izyumenko, Intellectual
Property Before the European Court of Human Rights] (discussing I.P. and human rights in
the case law of the Strasbourg Court).
40. See, e.g., Jonathan Griffiths, Taking Power Tools to the Acquis – The Court of Justice,
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Union Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 144 (Christophe Geiger, et al. eds., 2018); see also Stijn
van Deursen & Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the Crossroads: Clarifying the Role for
Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 1080 (2018).
41. Christophe Geiger, “Fair Use” Through Fundamental Rights: When Freedom of Artistic
Expression Allows Creative Appropriations and Opens up Statutory Copyright Limitations, in
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Wee
Loon Ng, Haochen Sun and Shyam Balganesh, eds., forthcoming 2019).
42. Despite the fact that the E.C.H.R., pending the E.U. obligatory accession to it,
has not been formally incorporated into E.U. law, Article 10 (freedom of expression)
of the E.C.H.R. is applicable to E.U. law for several reasons. First, all E.U. Member
States are also parties to the E.C.H.R. Second, Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European
Union states that fundamental rights recognized by the E.C.H.R. constitute general
principles of E.U. law. Finally, and most importantly, Article 52(3) of the E.U. Charter
on Fundamental Rights provides that the rights contained in the Charter, which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the E.C.H.R., are to have the same meaning and
scope as those laid down by the E.C.H.R. Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the
E.C.H.R., notably corresponds to Article 11 (freedom of expression and information)
of the E.U. Charter. Furthermore, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property)
of the E.C.H.R. corresponds to Article 17 (right to property) of the E.U. Charter.
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Coming back to the mentioned phenomenon of raised application of
freedom of expression to copyright cases, this situation results from a
spectacular uprising in recent years of fundamental rights application by
civil courts both at European supranational (E.Ct.H.R. and C.J.E.U.) and
national levels. 43 In the context of intellectual property law, scholars have
often been interpreting it as a specific judicial response to existing
imbalances of the current E.U. copyright framework. 44 Irrespective of
the recent E.U. copyright reform that resulted in the adoption, among
others, of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
(D.S.M.) declaring certain copyright exceptions mandatory, 45 the new
reformed rules are not promising to solve the issue of copyright
imbalances in the near future. In such a situation, European judges
started having recourse to legal mechanisms outside of copyright law to
allow for some flexibilities when applying copyright limitations. They did
so either by interpreting the existing provisions in the light of their
fundamental rights justifications (approach of the C.J.E.U. 46) or even
43. Jonathan Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of Justice, the Right
to Property and European Copyright Law, 38 EUR. L. REV. 65 (2013) [hereinafter
Constitutionalising or Harmonising?] (noting the C.J.E.U.’s recent “dramatic”
constitutionalization of European copyright law in the interest of harmonization).
44. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The
Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371 (2006) [hereinafter Geiger, “Constitutionalising”
Intellectual Property Law?]; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe, supra note 11;
Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?, supra note 43; Afori, supra note 37; Bernd
Justin Jütte, The Beginning of a (Happy?) Relationship: Copyright and Freedom of Expression in
Europe, 38 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 11 (2016).
45. See Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC
and 2001/29/EC, 2019 PE–CONS 51/19 [hereinafter Directive 2019/790]. The new
Directive notably introduces four mandatory exceptions for text and data mining
(TDM) for research purposes (Article 3); a general TDM exception for other purposes
(Article 4); an exception for teaching and educational purposes (Article 5); and an
exception for the preservation of cultural heritage (Article 6). See generally, Geiger,
Frosio, and Bulayenko, The EU Commission’s Proposal to Reform Copyright Limitations, supra
note 2; Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko, The Exception
for Text and Data Mining (TDM) in the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market–Legal Aspects, CTR. FOR INT’L INTELL. PROP. STUD., Mar. 2018.
46. See, e.g., Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et
éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), [2011] ECR, I-12006, ¶ 55; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard
VerlagsGmbH et al., [2011], ECR, I–12533, ¶¶ 132–33; Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging
van Auteurs v. Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 26–30 (Feb.16, 2012); Case
C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH et al., 2014 EUR–
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sometimes more radically by using fundamental rights as an external limit
on copyright law (approach of the E.Ct.H.R. and certain national courts
in Europe 47). Such balancing tools were found by using the test of
Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 23–40 (Mar. 27, 2014); Case C-201/13, Deckmyn, et al. v.
Vandersteen, et al., 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 36 (Sept. 3, 2014); Case C-160/15,
GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Neth. BV et al., 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 56
(Sept. 8, 2016); Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Ger. GmbH, 2016 EURLex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 102 (Sept. 15, 2016).
47. See Ashby Donald v. France, No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R 1 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115845; Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, No.
40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117513; Cour
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 13, 2003, Bull.
Civ. I, No. 01–14384 (Fr.); Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] June 12,
2001,
4
Ob127/01g,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_20010612_OGH0002_0040OB00
127_01G0000_000/JJT_20010612_OGH0002_0040OB00127_01G0000_000.pdf;
Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.); Scientology v. XS4ALL
[2003] NZCA 99/1040 at [¶ 6] (N.Z.); Supreme Court of the canton of Zurich, Sept. 9,
2004, Medialex 231 (2004); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 1e civ., Jan. 30, 2007, Bull. Civ. I, No. 9 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. Civ. I, No. 13–27391
(Fr.);
BVerfG,
1
BvR
1585/13,
May
31,
2016,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/
05/rs20160531_1bvr158513.html [hereinafter 1 BvR 1585/13]. As it concerns the
C.J.E.U., in the three recent judgments rendered in summer 2019, the C.J.E.U.
pronounced that freedom of expression is not allowed for an external application to EU
copyright. Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2019
EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29, 2019), ¶ 64; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf
Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29, 2019), ¶ 65; and
Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29,
2019), ¶ 49. However, such a position of the C.J.E.U. might turn incompatible with the
European legal order including the E.Ct.H.R. case law that mandates a case-by-case
approach. Arguably, such a position will not be possible anymore when the E.U.
accedes to the European Convention on Human Rights – a legal obligation that became
binding on the E.U. with the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December
2009 (see Article 6(2) T.E.U. as amended by Article 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon and
Article 59(2) E.C.H.R. as amended by Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the E.C.H.R.).
After the accession, the C.J.E.U. would need to take into account the precedents from
the E.Ct.H.R. case law. The C.J.E.U.’s categorical exclusion of any external freedom of
expression exception to copyright law therefore raises the questions of the
“constitutionality” of the Luxemburg Court’s position in the sense of its compatibility
with the E.U. treaties and the fundamental rights order in the E.U. See Christophe
Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Constitutionalization of IP Law in the EU and the Funke
Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!
(forthcoming 2020) (discussing further the C.J.E.U. judgments in Funke Medien, Pelham
and Spiegel Online); see also Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression
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proportionality, a mechanism intrinsic to human rights law in general and
the right to freedom of expression in particular. 48
This article discusses how the freedom of expression’s test of
proportionality has led to the opening of copyright exceptions in Europe.
The paper is structured as follows: (II) it first gives some background
information on the recent developments on European legislative and
technological landscapes that brought the discussion on copyright
limitations to a new level of urgency; (III) starting from the premise that
opening of European copyright system has become a cultural (and
technological) necessity, the article then proceeds to look more generally
at whether “fair use,” understood as a system of copyright limitations
drafted in an open manner, can present a viable solution; (IV) concluding
that it can, the article then focuses on examining whether using the
freedom of expression’s test of proportionality as a “fair use” clause in
Europe can cure the disadvantages of other approaches and of the
currently functioning system. It is argued that the test of proportionality
has indeed the ability to serve this purpose by providing an already
developed list of fairness factors analogous to those of U.S. fair use. This
article explores each of these factors in detail, highlighting both their
differences from and similarities with the U.S. fair use factors. Several
conclusions are drawn at the end, including the proposal of a legislative
introduction of the FoE-inspired opening provision in the E.U.
copyright framework (V).

II. PROBLEMS OF E.U. COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK:
PRACTICAL EXAMPLES AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
In May 2015, when the European Commission announced its
intention to reform the current set of E.U. copyright rules, 49 there existed
as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows
the Way, CTR. FOR INT’L INTELL. PROP. STD. (Dec. 2018).
48. Cf. Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, Protecting the Right of Freedom of Expression
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in A HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS (Council of Europe, 2017) [hereinafter Bychawska-Siniarska, Protecting
the Right of Freedom of Expression Under the European Convention on Human Rights].
49. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single
Market Strategy for Europe, at 2, COM (2015) 192 final (June 5, 2015), https://eur-
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high expectations that the above-outlined problems of imbalances,
inflexibility, and the lack of legal certainty would be solved at least to
some reasonable degree. 50 These expectations were heightened because
by that time, it was not only the academic community, the users, or the
NGOs and civil rights organizations that were advocating a profound
rethinking of European copyright system. 51 The representatives of the
Commission were themselves admitting that the E.U. copyright laws,
InfoSoc foremost, were “ill-adapted,” “fragmented,” “inflexible,” “often
irrelevant,” and not keeping up with the technological developments. 52
However, the text of the new Directive on Copyright in the D.S.M. that
has recently been adopted by the European Parliament does not promise
to solve thereby identified problems. 53 As the European Copyright
Society has highlighted:
Despite its ambitious overarching goal and key objectives, as stated (inter alia)
in the preamble of the proposed D.S.M. Directive, the Commission’s reform
package does not seem to reflect an overall vision of the future of E.U.
copyright law and fails to deliver on its promise of wholesale copyright reform.
The copyright package proposes only piecemeal solutions, leaving the existing
– already fragmented and partly outdated – copyright acquis intact. 54

In what follows, we outline a few practical examples of persisting
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Frederico Leva, A Wikimedian Asks European Parliament Members for
Copyright
Reform,
WIKIMEDIA
FOUNDATION
(Apr.
24,
2015),
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2015/04/24/european-copyright-reform/ (recalling the
meeting between European Parliament and a Wikimedia contributor and proponent
regarding the need for copyright reform).
52. European Commission Press Release Speech/14/528, Our Single Market is
Crying Out for Copyright Reform (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release] (referring
to the then existing E.U. Copyright framework as dated).
53. See Directive 2019/790, supra note 45.
54. European Copyright Society (E.C.S.), General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform
Package,
at
3
(Jan.
24,
2017),
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinionon-eu-copyright-reform-def.pdf. Some positive dynamics reflected in the new Directive
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (D.S.M.), however, also need to be noted.
Among those is an introduction of an exception for digital and cross-border teaching
activities (Article 5 of the Directive on Copyright in the D.S.M.) and for text and data
mining (Articles 3 and 4) as well as provisions securing the contractual positions of
creators vis-à-vis derivative rightholders (Article 18 et seq.).
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problems associated with the present E.U. copyright system, which
become more and more patent with the development of new
technologies that the recent copyright reform did not solve. Of course,
this list of topics is non-exhaustive; other issues could be addressed or
are likely to emerge in the future due to new economic, social, or
technological developments. We also point at certain new problems that
can arise as a result of the new Directive on Copyright in the D.S.M.

A. SEARCH ENGINES
One example of the negative impact of restrictive construction of E.U.
E&Ls is its effects on the operational infrastructure of the Internet:
search engines in particular. A case widely cited in the literature is the suit
brought against Google for the unlicensed use by the Google Image
Search service of thumbnails of copyrighted images. 55 In the United
States, the use was qualified as fair and thus permitted by the fair use
limitation, as it was considered transformative (the use was for a different
purpose than the original) and did not impact the potential market for
the work. 56 In Europe however, the German Federal Supreme Court
could not fit the use of thumbnails under any of the domestically existing
exceptions 57 and, absent any authority to create a new limitation, had no
other choice but to creatively stretch the concept of implied consent to
achieve the result in the public’s interest. 58 The Court held that by failing
to protect the content of her website technically from access by search
engines, the copyright owner implicitly consented to the reproduction of

55. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1155–57 (9th Cir. 2007).
56. Id. at 1163–68.
57. BGH, Apr. 29, 2010, I ZR 69/08, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=51998&pos=0&anz=.
Notably, quotation did not apply due to its construction in German law, which subjects
this exception to the requirements of criticism or review – the context clearly absent in
the case of an Image Search service.
58. Id.;
see
also
BGH,
Oct.
19,
2011,
I
ZR
140/10,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi–
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=2011–
10&Seite=4&nr=59857&pos=134&anz=292; BGH, Sept. 21, 2017, I ZR 11/16,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi–
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=2017–
9&Seite=2&nr=80322&pos=72&anz=270 (subsequently finding that no copyright
infringement results from the use of thumbnails by search engines).
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her works as previews in image search engines. 59 The German Federal
Supreme Court’s decision was criticized in the literature for extending
the concept of implied consent far beyond its original meaning and
purpose with potential negative consequences for future instances of the
concept’s application. 60 At the same time, criticism of the decision goes
hand-in-hand with the recognition that the judiciary is the last to blame
and that it was for the legislature to ensure that the copyright system is
sufficiently flexible to provide the common sense solutions without
compromising other legal concepts. 61 The Google Image case thus serves

59. Guido Westkamp, Emerging Escape Clauses? Online Exhaustion, Consent, and
European Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF
TRADE 61 (Jan Rosen ed., 2012) (explaining that the Court established through the
consent doctrine a general escape clause; “an additional limitation outside the
enumeration of acceptable limitations under Article 5 E.U.C.D.” According to this
scholar, “this resonates with more expansive balancing approaches, such as the fair use
rule under U.S. copyright law that incorporates a public interest test, a general
recognition of communication freedom, and a directly applicable defense.”).
60. See Matthias Leistner, The German Federal Supreme Court’s Judgment on Google’s Image
Search–A Topical Example of the “Limitations” of the European Approach to Exceptions and
Limitations, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 417 (2011); Lucie
Guibault, Why Cherry–Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation: The Case of the Limitations on
Copyright Under Directive 2001/29/EC, 1 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. AND E–COMM.
L. 55, ¶¶ 10–12 (2010); Senftleben, Bridging the Differences between Copyright’s Legal
Traditions, supra note 29, at 536–38; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe, supra
note 11, at 12.
61. See Martin Senftleben, The Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use
Provisions, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231, 248–49 (2017) [hereinafter Senftleben, The Perfect
Match] (stating that, while an “assumption of implicit consent creates additional
flexibility, it does not solve the problem of insufficient flexibility within the system of
copyright exceptions in the E.U. Moreover, it overstretches the general private law
doctrine of implicit consent to solve a specific copyright problem. This, in turn, gives rise
to new legal problems in other fields of private law where a comparably broad notion of implicit
consent leads to unsatisfactory results.” (emphasis added)); see also Tito Rendas,
Destereotyping the Copyright Wars: The “Fair Use vs. Closed List” Debate in the EU, Catolica
Glob.
Sch.
Law,
Portugal
16
(2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657482
(“[T]he
closed
catalogue [of E.U. exceptions to copyright] puts judges who want to harbor new and
benign technology-enabled uses of copyrighted works between a rock and a hard place;
either they arrogate to themselves an illegitimate authority, engaging in ample
interpretations when it is not at all clear that they can do so, or they judge it infringing,
hoping that the legislator will include them in future reviews of the catalogue. . . .
[C]ourts frequently follow the first path. But when they do so, further problem arises
[which is] . . . the risk of curtailing the principle of separation of powers.”).
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as an example that, contrary to what has been sometimes claimed, 62 the
exhaustive list of exceptions cannot provide sufficient flexibility by being
regularly fine-tuned. 63

B. MACHINE LEARNING
Another example is machine learning. As it has been emphasized, E.U.
copyright framework poses obstacles to machine learning by creating
bias in the way machines can be trained. 64 The E.U. copyright rules
currently in force leave the question on whether copyrighted data can be
used to train artificial intelligence in a legislative limbo. 65 By contrast, the
new Directive on Copyright in the D.S.M. introduces the text and data
mining exception that could potentially provide a solution to this
problem. 66 Initially, the new mandatory exception targeted exclusively
research institutions and was limited to the purposes of scientific
research. 67 However later on, an additional exception for non-research
62. See, e.g., André Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three–Step Test, 32 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 277, 282 (2010) (stating “[i]t is not true that the exhaustive legal
list of exceptions, even interpreted strictly, would hinder any adaptation to new
techniques and to new needs.”).
63. A vast number of scholars support more flexibility and criticize the closed list
of E.U. copyright exceptions. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, The
Information Society Directive, in EU COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 395, ¶ 11.93 (Irini
Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans, eds., 2014); Christophe Geiger, The Future of Copyright in
Europe: Striking a Fair Balance between Protection and Access to Information, Report for the
Committee on Culture, Science and Education, EUR. PARL. ASS., 6 (July 2009),
https://www.unistra.fr/uploads/media/Report_Future_of_Copyright.pdf;
Overprotection and Protection Overlaps, supra note 12, at 14.
64. Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko, Crafting a Text
and Data Mining Exception for Machine Learning and Big Data in the Digital Single Market, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA, 95 (Xavier Seuba et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Geiger,
Frosio, and Bulayenko, Crafting a Text and Data Mining Exception]; M. Cedric Manara,
Copyright and Big Data– A View from the Industry, UNIVERSITE DE STRASBOURG: CANAL
2 (Cedric Manara, May 4, 2017), http://www.canalc2.tv/video/14517.
65. Xavier Seuba et al., Introduction, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL
TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA, 11, 15–16 (Xavier
Seuba et al. eds., 2018).
66. See Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko, Text and
Data Mining in the Proposed Copyright Reform: Making the EU Ready for an Age of Big Data?,
49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 814, 815–20 (2018) (detailing the new
text and data mining exception).
67. Id. at 822.
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organizations has also been introduced during the negotiations. 68 The
latter exception was originally optional but was made mandatory during
the parliamentary process, which is real progress, but it applies only on
the condition that the use of works has not been expressly reserved by
their rightholder. 69 As a result, any use of copyrighted information by
businesses, including startups, to create algorithms on the basis of which
artificial intelligence can be trained, can still be labeled infringing in
certain Member States if rightholders decide to reserve the use of their
work for text and data mining purposes, potentially overruling the
granted permission to use by the Directive. In the United States, by
contrast, such use would most likely rate as fair, 70 notably as a
transformative use for a different purpose than the original (which
pursues, moreover, a socially valuable goal 71). In any event, the condition
that the use should not be reserved by rightholders to benefit from the
exception will most likely leave the practice of commercial text and data
68. See Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 2018 on the
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital
Single Market, at art. 3a, COM (2016) 593 (Sept. 12, 2018) (note that this provision is
not anymore up to date (see the final text of Directive 2019/790, supra note 45)).
69. See Directive 2019/790, supra note 45. The final version of the Directive
envisages, alongside a provision on text and data mining for the purposes of scientific
research in Article 3, an additional “exception or limitation for text and data mining” in
Article 4, which reads as follows (emphasis added): “(1.) Member States shall provide
for an exception or limitation to the rights provided for in Article 5(a) and Article 7(1)
of Directive 96/9/EC, Article 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC, Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of
Directive 2009/24/EC and Article 15(1) of this Directive for reproductions and
extractions of lawfully accessible works and other subject matter for the purposes of
text and data mining; (2.) Reproductions and extractions made pursuant to paragraph 1
may be retained for as long as is necessary for the purposes of text and data mining; (3.)
The exception or limitation provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply on condition that the
use of works and other subject matter referred to in that paragraph has not been expressly reserved by
their rightholders in an appropriate manner, such as machine readable means in the case
of content made publicly available online; (4.) This Article shall not affect the
application of Article 3 of this Directive.”.
70. Reto M. Hilty, Big Data: Ownership and Use in the Digital Age, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG
DATA, 85, 92–94 (Xavier Seuba, et al., eds., 2018); Geiger, Frosio, and Bulayenko,
Crafting a Text and Data Mining Exception, supra note 64, at 110–11.
71. One example of such fair use could be the websites that fight fake news on the
basis of machines trained to recognize fake data. See Mar Masson Maack, Whoops! EU’s
copyright reforms might suck for AI startups, TNW X (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://thenextweb.com/eu/2017/03/21/whoops-eus-copyright-reforms-mightsuck-for-ai-startups/#.tnw_rEMp0AMY.
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mining for non-research purposes uncertain in the E.U. 72

C. MISUSES OF COPYRIGHT FOR THE PURPOSES NOT
CORRESPONDING TO ITS RATIONALES
Another problem of E.U. copyright concerns the fact that the current
system allows for abusive uses of copyright-law mechanisms to achieve
goals highly unrelated to the goals of fostering creativity and
dissemination of expression. 73
The most recent example is the so-called Afghanistan Papers case
decided by the C.J.E.U. in July 2019. 74 The case concerns unauthorized
publication by a daily newspaper of military reports with confidential
information held by the German government. Since, pursuant to the
national law, the protection of confidential information in Germany was
not a strong enough ground for restricting the newspaper’s free speech
rights, the German government instead decided to rely on its copyright
over the reports to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information.
The Advocate General Szpunar, who had first stated his opinion on
this case, expressed the view that although both copyright protection and
protection of national security through non-disclosure of confidential
military information constitute legitimate restrictions on the scope of free
speech, 75 one cannot be used to substitute another. 76
72. See Geiger, Frosio, and Bulayenko, The Exception for Text and Data Mining (TDM)
in the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market–Legal Aspects, supra note 45,
at 26–31 (analyzing, more broadly, the positive and negative impacts of the European
Commission’s Proposal to introduce a mandatory text and data mining exception).
73. See Sganga & Scalzini, From Abuse of Right to European Copyright Misuse, supra
note 37 (discussing the notion of copyright misuse); CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT
D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A L’INFORMATION–APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARÉ
388 ET SEQ. (Litec, 2004); Lucie Guibault, Copyright Limitations and Contracts: An Analysis
of the Contractual Overridability of Limitations on Copyright 184 (2002) (“[I]n continental
Europe, one of the main instruments of control over the exercise of private rights is
the doctrine of abuse of rights.”).
74. Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2019
EUR-Lex CELEX.
75. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW
GmbH v. Germany, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 45-49 (Oct. 25, 2018). See Geiger
& Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation, supra note 47; Bernd Jütte,
Advocate General Suggests that Germany Cannot Rely on Copyright to Protect Confidential
Information, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 83 (2019).
76. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW
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According to Advocate General, such a substitution of the public
interest goal with the goal of protection of the State’s copyright was
inadmissible because “the Member State cannot invoke its copyright
instead of the public interest.” 77 Even if this were recognized as a
legitimate aim of interference with free speech rights of others, such
interference would have failed the test of necessity. 78 Notably, the
“undisguised aim” of protecting the confidentiality of the information 79
fell “completely outside the scope of copyright . . . [which was] used here
to pursue objectives that are entirely unrelated to it.” 80 The Court of
Justice did not deem it necessary to address the issue of copyright misuse;
it relied instead on another Advocate General’s observation 81 in
accordance with which the copyright law’s requirement of originality was
a sufficient safety valve insuring that purely informative documents such
as those presumably at issue in the Afghanistan Papers case would not fall
within the subject-matter of copyright protection. 82
National practice knows, however, other cases in which copyright,
instead of serving as an engine of free expression, was used for the sole
purpose of blocking access to information to either stifle unwelcome

GmbH v. Germany, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 49 (Oct. 25, 2018).
77. Id. at ¶ 56.
78. Id. at ¶ 69.
79. Id. at ¶ 32.
80. Id. at ¶ 61.
81. Id. at ¶¶ 17-20.
82. Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2019
EUR-Lex CELEX, at ¶¶ 18-25.
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criticism 83 or protect one’s privacy. 84 Similar trends can be traced in the
trademark law too, where extensive protection against blurring and
tarnishing often serves primarily not the original functions of trademark
law (such as the prevention of consumer confusion) but the purpose of
silencing (frequently legitimate) criticism of corporate policies. 85 It is still
not uncommon for such cases to succeed 86 – the practice that, in full
consideration of the social function of intellectual property (I.P.), should
not subsist in the future. 87 This was also the position of the Advocate
83. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] June 12, 2001, 4
Ob127/01g,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?ResultFunctionToken=9b93c42f-f2134c6e-a6f5aaf8c91d1852&Position=1&Abfrage=Justiz&Gericht=&Rechtssatznummer=&Recht
ssatz=&Fundstelle=&AenderungenSeit=Undefined&SucheNachRechtssatz=False&S
ucheNachText=True&GZ=&VonDatum=&BisDatum=03.08.2019&Norm=&ImRis
SeitVonDatum=&ImRisSeitBisDatum=&ImRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSize=10
0&Suchworte=Medienprofessor&Dokumentnummer=JJT_20010612_OGH0002_00
40OB00127_01G0000_000 (concerning the use by the rightholders of their copyright
“with the sole objective of hindering any criticism towards their media campaign.”);
Michelin v. CAW-Canada, [1997] 2 FC 306 (Can.) (finding that the use by the trade union
of the Michelin’s Bibendum logo in a campaign critical of the company’s corporate
policies infringed Michelin’s copyright); Scientology v. XS4ALL, [2003] NZCA 99/1040
at ¶ 6 (N.Z.) (concerning unsuccessful attempts by the Church of Scientology to invoke
copyright protection over its internal documents in order to prevent their publication
on a website for the purposes of criticism).
84. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 90 (2nd Cir. 1987) (successfully
invoking copyright in order to stop the publication of biography about Salinger and
thereby preserve his privacy); see Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
304 (2nd Cir. 1966) (displaying attempts by Howard Hughes to use copyright in order
to suppress the publication of his biography, which were ultimately prevented by the
application of fair use); see also Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1125, 1128–30 (1999) (discussing the use of copyright to block access to
information for the sake of personal privacy).
85. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Mar. 3, 2003,
2001/14371 and 2001/06682; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] com., Apr. 8, 2008, Bull. civ. IV, No. 06–10961 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Apr. 8, 2008, Bull. civ. I, No. 418 (Fr.). See
Christophe Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression – The Proportionality of Criticism,
38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 317 (2007) [hereinafter Geiger, Trade
Marks and Freedom of Expression].
86. See, e.g., the ex parte order of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, (May
25, 2008) (requesting an artist to seize the use of the painting critical of the modern
culture of consumerism, which incorporated representation of the Louis Vuitton bag).
87. See Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How
Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN
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General, who rejected the practice of using copyright protection for the
aims completely alien to this legal regime. 88

D. LACK OF LEGAL RECOGNITION OF CREATIVE REUSES AND THE
SO-CALLED “DIGITAL REMIX CULTURE”
Finally, the lack of legal recognition of the so-called “digital remix
culture,” including the persisting absence of the user-generated content
exception in the E.U., creates another problematic area, 89 which
nevertheless the recent copyright reform did not seek to regulate. 90 Nor
is the C.J.E.U. always eager to solve the problem as demonstrated in the
recent pronouncements of the C.J.E.U. and its Advocate General on the
Pelham case that concerns music sampling. 91 Albeit recognizing that the
current list of copyright E&Ls in the E.U. “does not include a general
exception permitting the use of works of others for the purposes of
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 153 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2014) (discussing the social
function of property in general and intellectual property in particular).
88. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW
GmbH v. Germany, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶¶ 62–63 (Oct. 25, 2018).
89. See generally Bernd Justin Jutte, The E.U.’s Trouble with Mashups: From Disabling to
Enabling a Digital Art Form, 5 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. 172 (2014)
(analyzing the current European legal framework with regard to user generated content
and identifying its insufficiencies in particular with regard to enabling a legal mashup
culture); Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible
Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413 (2018); GIANCARLO FROSIO, RECONCILING
COPYRIGHT WITH CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY: THE THIRD PARADIGM 30 (Edward
Elgar Pub., 2018); Giancarlo Frosio, Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity From the Oral
Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a Witness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 341 (2014); Leonhard Dobusch et al., Digital Remix Culture: Five Contradictory
Concurrences, in PUBLIC DOMAIN 6–8 (Dominik Landwehr ed. 2015). See also Right to
Remix: Initiative for a European Copyright Reform https://right2remix.org/ (accessed
September 2019).
90. See Martin Senftleben, Bermuda Triangle - Licensing, Filtering and Privileging UserGenerated Content Under the New Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at 3 (Apr.
4, 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3367219 (regarding
the impact of the copyright reform on user-generated content); see also Geiger, Freedom
of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law, supra note 89, at 430 (regarding the different
options available for European legislators and courts to secure creative uses in the
context of derivative works).
91. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v.
Hutter, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Dec. 12, 2018); Judgment of the CJEU in Case
C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, 2019 EURLex CELEX (July 29, 2019).
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creating a new work,” 92 neither the Advocate General nor the Court in
its judgment find judicial construction of such an exception admissible. 93
Meanwhile in the United States, case law exists that allows amateur users,
through the application of the fair use doctrine (and thus even absent
legislative amendments), to contribute to the cultural development by
building on pre-existing copyrighted material of others. 94
Summing up, the examples outlined above point to the urgent need
for more flexibility in European copyright. This calls for a serious
reconsideration of an idea of possible introduction of open-ended
copyright limitation in E.U. copyright acquis. 95

92. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v.
Hutter, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 54 (Dec. 12, 2018).
93. Id. at ¶ 94; Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others
v. Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29, 2019), at ¶
65. According to the C.J.E.U., notably, the reach of the right of reproduction and the
interpretation of the quotation exception should be sufficient to ensure that the
freedom of expression of samplers is appropriately safeguarded. More specifically, the
exclusive right of reproduction should be interpreted as not extending towards nonrecognizable derivative works made in the exercise of the freedom of arts, Judgment of
the CJEU in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian SchneiderEsleben, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29, 2019), at ¶¶ 31, 37, 39, whereas the exception
for the purposes of quotation should be understood as covering recognizable, but
“dialogic,” use of the original work, subject to certain other conditions. Id. at ¶¶ 71, 72.
Thus, a clearly recognizable sample can still be legitimate in the context of a creative
use performed in the exercise of artistic freedom (and thus, arguably, a “dialogue”). It
is to be feared, however, that the “dialogue” situation will be interpreted very
restrictively by the C.J.E.U. in the light of Article 17(2) (protection of intellectual
property) of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights as the quotation in the case of
unlicensed sampling comes without remuneration. In fact, the C.J.E.U., albeit arguably,
adhering to a more liberal position with regards to music sampling than that taken by
the Advocate General in his Opinion on this case (who advised that any music
sampling, unless licensed, should not be permitted in the E.U., see Opinion of Advocate
General Szpunar in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hutter, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS ¶ 96 (Dec. 12, 2018)), seems to nevertheless indicate that the sample in the
Pelham case, a typical sample situation, is not permissible.
94. See, e.g., Senftleben, The Perfect Match, supra note 61, at 246 (citing Warner Bros.
Ent. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d 513, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing that courts will
find fair use when the secondary use produces a value that benefits the broader public
interest even if the use is a commercial exploitation of original work)).
95. It needs to be noted that, despite the seriousness of the situation, the recent
copyright reform did not introduce an open-ended limitation to copyright law.
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“FAIR USE” AS A SOLUTION?

A. REBUTTING COMMON ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE “FAIR USE”
INTRODUCTION IN EUROPE
In the following section, we consider whether an open-ended
copyright limitation of the “fair use” type 96 can constitute a solution to
the current rigidity of the E.U. copyright system. To this end, the most
commonly advanced arguments against the “fair use” introduction in
Europe are looked at in an attempt to unveil whether these arguments
sustain a balanced evaluation.
1. Legal Uncertainty
One of the most frequent critiques of the fair use doctrine is its
vagueness and lack of legal certainty. 97 Since the doctrine is largely
construed judicially, the application of different fairness factors to each
particular case has been considered at times controversial if not
arbitrary. 98 This would lead, in the opinion of some authors, to a situation
of legal uncertainty in which the users cannot be sure in advance which
use is permissible. 99 Such a situation can, the argument unfolds, have
chilling effects on certain uses that could have otherwise been ruled fair
to the detriment of both ordinary users and Small-to-Medium
Enterprises (in particular if one brings the high costs of litigation into
equation). 100
96. As we have already stated in the introduction, the term “fair use” is applied here
to reflect the need of opening up the currently closed list of copyright limitations in the
E.U. The term should thus be understood simply as an open-ended copyright limitation
by no means identical to U.S. fair use (as highlighted by bringing the term in quotes
throughout this article).
97. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Fairest of Them All and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., 263, 282 (2003) (“[I]t is largely a fairy tale to conclude that the
four factors determine resolution of concrete fair use cases.”); Gideon Parchomovsky
& Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 93 (2010) (calling the fair
use doctrine “impossible to predict”).
98. See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1525, 1545–46 (2004) (showing that courts have seemingly arbitrarily applied
standards to fair use issues).
99. Id. at 1558–59.
100. See, e.g., Paul Torremans, The Perspective of the Introduction of a European Fair Use
Clause, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: CHALLENGES AND
PERSPECTIVES 319, 332–33 (Tatiana-Helene Synodinou ed., 2012) (“[U]ncertainty
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However, it must be noted that vague and open-ended legal concepts
requiring further judicial interpretation exist in civil law systems as well.
Those include a three-step test already mentioned above, which is itself
an open norm with quite broad criteria (steps) of application. 101 Other
examples are the copyright law’s originality criterion and the concept of
“communication to the public” under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc
Directive. 102 Furthermore, as it concerns the civil law systems’ exceptions
and limitations, those are never, as Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais,
and Martin Senftleben note, “drafted so specifically as to be free from
the need for interpretation or to be devoid of ambiguity as applied in the
specific case.” 103 Moreover, certain exceptions have additional internal
balancing mechanisms requiring further judicial interpretation on a caseby-case basis. Thus, a quotation exception of Article 10 of the Berne
Convention makes references to “fair practice” and the quotation’s
“purpose.” 104 In trademark law too, open exceptions can be found – one
only has to consider, for example, a due cause defense 105 or the reference
to “honest practices in industrial or commercial matters,” 106 which serve
as an additional constraint on the application of trademark limitations.
pushes particularly the smaller defendants with less deep pockets to settle, take a license,
or change their behaviour, even in those circumstances where ultimately they had
copyright law on their side in the sense that they did not step on the exclusive right of
the copyrightholder.”).
101. See Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three–step Test: An Analysis of
the Three–Step Test, in INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (2004); see also
Geiger, The Role of the Three–Step Test, supra note 34, at 17 (stating that the “three-step
test” is an instrument of flexibility similar to the fair use clause in the United States).
102. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 6, at art. 3(1).
103. Geiger, Gervais, and Senftleben, The Three–Step Test Revisited, supra note 7, at
614.
104. See Lionel Bently & Tanya Aplin, Whatever Became of Global Mandatory Fair Use?
A Case Study in Dysfunctional Pluralism (Univ. of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
34/2018,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119041 [hereinafter Bently &
Aplin, Whatever Became of Global Mandatory Fair Use?]; see also Lionel Bently & Tanya
Aplin, Displacing the Dominance of the Three–Step Test: The Role of Global, Mandatory Fair Use
(Univ. of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 33/2018, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119056 [hereinafter Bently &
Aplin, Displacing the Dominance of the Three–Step Test].
105. Council Directive 2015/2436, art. 10(2)(c), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 11 (E.U.)
(approximating the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Text with EEA
relevance)).
106. Council Directive 2015/2436, art. 14(2), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 12 (EU).
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Many other provisions of trademark law are likewise open to
interpretation, such as the ground of refusal of trademark registration
based on the public policy or morals 107 or the requirement of unfairness
in relation to the use of trademarks with a reputation. 108
It also must be kept in mind that I.P. laws frequently interact with
other legal regimes, which likewise contain broad notions susceptible to
diverse interpretations. Thus, open-ended concepts of the human rights
law, including the test of proportionality, are already widely applied to
intellectual property cases across the E.U. 109 Implied consent, abuse of
right, fairness, reasonableness, legality, and effectiveness all stand in the
same line of broad legal concepts vastly operated by European judges
when resolving I.P. disputes. 110
By contrast, there is a growing recognition in the literature of the fact
that an elaborated list of fairness factors, endorsed by the solid body of
case law, can indeed allow for sufficient clarity and legal certainty. 111 In
Europe, this list can be found in the law on FoE and in the application
within its framework of the principle of proportionality developed
throughout the years of the human rights jurisprudence. Courts can
therefore rely on a vast body of case law from the E.Ct.H.R. and several

107. Council Directive 2015/2436, art. 4(1)(f), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 7 (EU).
108. Council Directive 2015/2436, art. 10(2)(c), at 11.
109. See Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial:
Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity through Freedom of Expression, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014) [hereinafter Geiger & Izyumenko, Copyright on the
Human Rights’ Trial]; see also Elena Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of
Copyright in the Digital Era: A European Perspective 19 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 115 (2016)
[hereinafter Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era];
Geiger & Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the European Court of Human Rights, supra
note 39.
110. Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright, supra note 28, at 282–83.
111. See Leistner, supra note 60, at 437 (“[T]he factor-based fair use test in the U.S.
has been developed by the courts into a body of reasonably predictable case law.” (emphasis
added)); Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre–Piece, supra note 10, at 91 (“[T]he fair use doctrine
has given rise to a detailed body of sub-rules and sub-principles that exceed in precision the
tools employed to resolve similar problems in many jurisdictions with less flexible
systems of exceptions.” (emphasis added)); Geiger, Gervais, and Senftleben, The Three–
Step Test Revisited, supra note 7, at 614 (“With every court decision, a further ‘special case’
becomes known, particularized, and thus ‘certain’ in the sense of the three-step test. A
sufficient degree of legal certainty thus may follow from established case law, as well as in detailed
legislation.” (emphasis added)).

2019]

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN "FAIR USE"

27

decades-long judicial traditions. 112 In the United States, an increasing
number of authors state likewise that fair use is more predictable than it
is usually claimed. 113
Against this background, the idea relied upon by the Advocate
General of the C.J.E.U. in his recent opinion on the Spiegel Online case
that any “fair use” clause project would be detrimental to the
harmonization of copyright in E.U. 114 is questionable at least. As
previously stated, courts in the E.U., including the Court of Justice, are
habitually relying on open-ended legal concepts, ensuring their
predictability and harmonious application through the development of
consistent case law surrounding such concepts. 115 By contrast, inconsistency
in interpreting even seemingly “straightforward” legal concepts is
capable of undermining both legal certainty and any project of
harmonization of European copyright law. 116 However, this is arguably a
separate problem, which should not be linked to the “fair use” project.
Finally, it has to be kept in mind that, as Jonathan Griffiths put it, “the
search for a doctrine that is both perfectly flexible and perfectly
foreseeable is doomed to failure,” 117 and “[a]ny obstacles to the
[European ‘fair use’] project should be viewed against the background of
the dire situation in which we currently find ourselves.” 118
112. See Geiger & Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the European Court of Human
Rights, supra note 39.
113. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 29; see also Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note
27; Netanel, supra note 29; Sag, Predicting Fair Use, supra note 29.
114. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH
v. Beck, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 63 (Jan. 10, 2019).
115. See Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 9.
116. One has to only think, for example, of how the issue of injuncting non-liable
Internet access providers has been dealt with recently in E.U., despite the seemingly
“predictable” safe harbour provisions of the E-Commerce Directive and the
prohibition therein of the general monitoring obligation. See Articles 12(3) and 15 of
the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive), OJ No. L 178 of 17 July
2000, p. 1. See also Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in
Copyright Enforcement Online: Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 43 (2016) [hereinafter Geiger & Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in
Copyright Enforcement Online]; Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Blocking Orders:
Assessing Tensions with Human Rights, CTR. FOR INT’L INTELL. PROP. STD., May 2019.
117. Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre–Piece, supra note 10, at 91.
118. Id.
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2. Problem of Civil Judges
Another argument that is frequently advanced against the introduction
of the open-ended exception in European copyright is that, unlike the
judges in the United States, the civil law judges are presumably unfit to
deal with open norms. 119
However, as demonstrated above, open concepts are already
continuously applied by judges across Europe, and civil judges hence
cannot be regarded as having less expertise than their colleagues across
the Atlantic. 120
A more valid argument seems to be the one suggesting that,
considering the differences behind the legal regimes of each of the
(currently) 28 E.U. Member States, the development of a coherent panEuropean “fair use” doctrine might prove more difficult than in one
country, such as the United States. 121 However, this problem is to a good
extent lifted when the European “fair use” is grounded in legal concept
unifying all Europe. This is the case of fundamental rights, which are
already being applied in a uniformed manner across Europe and on the
application of which a wide consensus exists. 122 This is evidenced among
others by a vast body of supranational case law developed both on the
levels of E.U. and the Council of Europe.
3. Cultural and Philosophical Unfit
Some scholars have expressed concerns that an idea of European “fair
use” is alien to the continental legal thinking copyright tradition that puts
the social good, and not the personality of the author, at the center of
the copyright system. 123 According to these scholars, as in most of the
119. See Senftleben, The Perfect Match, supra note 61, at 231.
120. See id. at 252.
121. Torremans, supra note 100, at 332–33.
122. See Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and
International) Intellectual Property Law, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012); see also Christophe Geiger,
Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Paul Torremans ed., 2015); Christophe Geiger,
Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights Instruments Towards a New Social
Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 661 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
123. Frederic Pollaud–Dulian, The Dragon and the White Whale: Three Steps Test and Fair
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civil law countries, the copyright philosophy’s emphasis is on the person
who has created the work, 124 and the public interest is secondary – a legal
thinking that lies at the basis of the narrow construction and
interpretation of copyright exceptions in continental Europe in contrast
to the common law systems. 125
It might be useful to recall, however, that the figure of the author has
in practice long lost its center place in the civil law world, giving way to
big corporate interests. 126 It is a common practice now in Europe that
young or niche writers, musicians, or other creators who do not relate to
the one percent of “super stars” or mainstream artists, assign their rights
almost entirely to the big publishing houses or music labels. They do so
for either the mere opportunity to get published, and hence acquire some
publicity, or for a very minimum remuneration. It is not these creators
(or not them mainly) who then participate in reaping the profits and in
vigorously enforcing strong exclusive rights against a narrowly
constructed public interest. Indeed, contrary to what the original
philosophical foundations of the continental European copyright
tradition might suggest, the author is often the great forgotten of the droit
d’auteur system. A large majority of creators, in the absence of an effective
author’s contract law, frequently participate only insufficiently in the
exploitation of their works. 127
Use, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 158, 167–68
(Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2013); Torremans, supra note 100, at 334; Leval, supra note 25,
at 1128 (reminding that while the European copyright law evolved to consider the social
good, the U.S. copyright law never had this idea in mind during its creation and
interpretation and stating “[o]ur copyright law has developed over hundreds of years
for a very different purpose and with rules and consequences that are incompatible with
the droit moral.”).
124. In this “creator-centered” copyright tradition, the term “authors’ rights” is
preferred to the term “copyright” to establish the clear link between the creator and the
rights she owns. See Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, supra note
4, at 515-16, 527.
125. Pollaud–Dulian, supra note 123, at 167–68; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, Fair Use
in Europe, supra note 11, at 7; Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright, supra note 28, at 280.
126. Ysolde Gendreau, The Image of Copyright, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209, 211
(2006) (“The overall impression today is clearly not that of the solitary author who
is shivering in an attic; an economic and corporate image dominates the scene and takes
centre stage.”).
127. See generally Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, supra note 4;
Reto M. Hilty, Verbotsrecht vs. Vergütungsanspruch: Suche nach Konsequenzen der tripolaren
Interessenlage im Urheberrecht, in PERSPEKTIVEN DES GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS UND

30

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:1

Another point that should not be lost from the discussion is that, after
all, the differences between common law and civil law countries should
not be exaggerated. The internationalization of the subject has narrowed
the gap considerably. 128 The reasons behind subordination of public
good to corporate interests (the tendency which can be traced in the
common law world alike) are largely political and not purely (and
probably not primarily) ideological.
The final point that can be made on the subject of cultural
“foreignness” of flexibly defined exceptions is that the idea of
utilitarianism, which is said to be absent from the droits d’auteur tradition,
is far from unusual in reality to European legal thinking. One of the
reasons for the raise in application of human rights to copyright law in
Europe is precisely the fact that the “non-utilitarian” idea of copyright
finds itself more and more in conflict with the deeply utilitarian
conception of human rights in Europe, which place the public good and
the general interest at the center of balancing different conflicting
interests. 129 It thus follows that, if only for the purpose of reconciling
WETTBEWERBSRECHTS, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD SCHRICKER ZUM 70
GEBURTSTAG 325 (Ansgar Ohly et al. eds., 2005); Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, supra note
31.
128. See Gillian Davies, The Convergence of Copyright and Authors’ Rights – Reality or
Chimera?, 26 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 964 (1995).
129. The E.U. copyright law’s tendency towards narrow interpretation of copyright
exceptions differs from not only the common law tradition but also from the “very
European” principles underlying the human rights law. If one looks at the E.Ct.H.R.
jurisprudence on Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS
5, she will find that the Court treats copyright as an exception to this right which (as
any exception to freedom of expression) must be “narrowly interpreted” and the
“necessity” for which must be “convincingly established.” Observer and Guardian v. United
Kingdom,
No.
13585/88,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶
59
(1991),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57705; Vogt v. Germany, No. 17851/91, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 52 (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58012; Wille v. Liechtenstein, No.
28396/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58338;
Rekvényi v. Hungary, No. 25390/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 42 (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163725 (emphasis added)). European copyright
law in its current evolutional twist thus appears to be in a direct conflict with European
human rights law; the E.Ct.H.R. states as a matter of settled case law that exceptions to
the right to freedom of expression (including copyright and other intellectual property
rights) must be narrowly interpreted, whereas the C.J.E.U., in its application of InfoSoc
asserts, likewise as a matter of settled case law, something directly on the opposite –

2019]

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN "FAIR USE"

31

European copyright with European human rights tradition, the current
approach to copyright exceptions in the E.U. needs to be reviewed.
4. No Remuneration
One of the frequent critiques of U.S. fair use is that it does not leave
the space for fair remuneration of the rightholder – in other words, fair
use in the United States is always the use for free. 130
In Europe, however, the construction of an open-ended limitation to
copyright does not necessarily presuppose the lack of any equitable
remuneration for the rightholder. 131 This was the idea behind the Wittem
group’s project of the European Copyright Code, 132 which conceived
that certain exceptions to copyright can be provided only for against the
payment of fair and adequate remuneration. Other models of flexibility
under European law, including the principle of proportionality, likewise
allow for a fair remuneration of rightholders. 133 We will return to this in
more detail in the subsequent sections of this paper. 134

B. PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENTLY EXISTING SOLUTIONS
As already mentioned in the introduction, several solutions on how to
“flexibilize” the European system of exceptions and limitations have
been advanced in the literature (including the use of other provisions
with open-ended wording, such as the three-step test in copyright law 135
that any derogation from the general rule of copyright protection should be interpreted
strictly. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] ECR, 106569, at ¶ 56.
130. See Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, supra note 31.
131. See generally P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Wittem Group’s European Copyright Code, at
349, https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/ILS_29_chapter17.pdf (last visited
Oct. 18, 2019) (explaining the flexibility involved in the European copyright system).
132. See European copyright code, supra note 35, at 11 (demonstrating a deliberate intent
to achieve balance between authors’ interests and freedom of access).
133. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5, Dec. 13,
2007, 2010 O.J. C 83/01 (establishing the principle of proportionality as fundamental
to E.U. law and legal action).
134. See infra Part IV, Section D.
135. See Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths, and Reto M. Hilty, Towards a Balanced
Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 30 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 489,
491 (2008) [hereinafter Geiger, Griffiths, and Hilty, Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the
“Three-Step Test”] (asserting that the three-step test was intended to be and is an innately
flexible standard); Senftleben, The International Three–Step Test, supra note 34, at 69
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or the balancing tests of certain copyright limitations – notably,
quotation 136).
Without going much into the details of these proposals, for which a
good deal of literature exists, we would only mention here that although
all of such solutions make a valuable contribution to the search for
improvements of European copyright, a systematic and coherent open
clause potentially addressing all situations where important fundamental
rights considerations can limit exclusive right is still to be developed. 137
Thus, the currently dominating proposal of using the three-step test in
an open manner as a “fair use” clause in Europe 138 is sometimes criticized
for the uncertainties surrounding the test’s meaning and the lack of
interpretation of each of the test’s steps 139 (notably due to the scarcity of
the case law on the test’s application140). Although it is true that these
(holding that the open-ended wording of the test is intended to provide legal flexibility
rather than legal uncertainty); Geiger, Gervais, and Senftleben, The Three–Step Test
Revisited, supra note 7, at 626 (concluding that the abstract nature of the test’s criteria
allows for flexible interpretation).
136. See Bently & Aplin, Displacing the Dominance of the Three–Step Test, supra note 104;
Bently & Aplin, Whatever Became of Global Mandatory Fair Use?, supra note 104.
137. See also Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre–Piece, supra note 10, at 89 (stating that
despite the value of existing proposals on opening up the European copyright system
of exceptions and limitations, “none provides a comprehensive solution to the
structural problem of inflexibility”).
138. See European copyright code, supra note 35, art. 5(5) (providing for an opening clause
alongside the list of exceptions akin to those of InfoSoc (but made mandatory and
drafted in a more open manner)). The clause of Article 5(5) of the Code allows the new
uses that are (1) “compatible to the uses enumerated” and (2) comply with the 3-step
test.
139. Pollaud–Dulian, supra note 123, at 165 (“[T]he three factors [of the three-step
test] . . . seem very complicated and somewhat vague.”); André Lucas, For a Reasonable
Interpretation of the Three–Step Test, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 277, 282 (2010) (stating
“[i]t is not true that the exhaustive legal list of exceptions, even interpreted strictly,
would hinder any adaptation to new techniques and to new needs.”).
140. See, e.g., Pollaud–Dulian, supra note 123, at 162, 163. The uncertainty in the test’s
application has led to criticism raised by scholars both opposing and welcoming further
flexibility in the system of copyright limitations. Concerns are also voiced that the threestep solution on exceptions would be directed only at legislators (national and E.U.).
See, e.g., Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre–Piece, supra note 10, at 90; see Lucas, supra note
139, at 277. But cf., Geiger, Griffiths, and Hilty, Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the
‘Three–Step Test’, supra note 135, at 489 (“In some jurisdictions, [the three-step test] not
only functions as a pre-legislative constraint but also governs the judicial interpretation
of exceptions and limitations.”). The three-step test is also sometimes criticized for the
exhaustive nature of its factors, see Pollaud-Dulian, “The Dragon and the White Whale,”
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uncertainties can be overcome through clear guidelines for balanced
interpretation, 141 admittedly the three-step test has not been drafted to
serve as an open-ended provision, and the wording of the criteria set
forth does not ideally reflect all concerns. 142 Other potential solutions,
such as implementing the clause analogous to U.S. fair use 143 or
transplanting the latter almost without modifications, 144 have as their
major flaws an absence of the relevant body of case law in Europe
and/or their unnuanced nature, not taking particularities of the
European legal tradition into account. 145
Finally, as it concerns the open-worded balancing tests inherent to
certain exceptions to copyright, such as quotation, those tests are
supra note 123, at 163, the predominantly economic focus of the test (if one thinks of
the W.T.O. interpretation), see Geiger, Gervais, & Senftleben, The Three–Step Test
Revisited, supra note 7, at 597; Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The
WTO Panel Decision and the “Three–Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 51-53 (2001), and the fact that the threestep test is not an obvious open-ended mechanism because it is constructed as a
negative tool in international treaties with the original aim of further restricting (not
opening) exceptions and limitations to copyright. See Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece,
supra note 10, at ¶ 18; Pollaud-Dulian, The Dragon and the White Whale, supra note 123, at
166, 168-69; Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, supra note 139, at
280.
141. See Geiger, Griffiths, & Hilty, Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three–Step
Test,” supra note 135; Geiger, Implementing an International Instrument for Interpreting Copyright
Limitations and Exceptions, supra note 34; Christophe Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais, and
Martin Senftleben, Understanding the “Three–Step Test”, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 167 (Daniel
Gervais ed., 2015).
142. See Geiger, Griffiths, and Hilty, Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three–Step
Test,” in Copyright Law, supra note 135, at 491; Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre–Piece, supra
note 10, at 92-93 (“[A] ‘test’ . . . came into being as an intentionally vague political
compromise formula and [its] meaning and requirements remain almost entirely
uncertain.”).
143. See, e.g., Global Network on Copyright User Rights, Model Flexible Copyright
Exception,
http://infojustice.org/wp–content/uploads/2012/12/Model–Flexible–
Copyright–Exception–Version–4.0.pdf (last visited Jan. 2018) (proposing a flexible
copyright exception suggestive of an open clause analogous to the U.S. concept of fair
use).
144. On the different models of transplanting the U.S. fair use to other countries
and on the complexities associated with such transplantation, see Peter K. Yu,
Customizing Fair Use Transplants 2 (Tex. A&M U. Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series,
Paper No. 17–78, Feb. 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3052158.
145. See id. at 11-12 (discussing European efforts to adapt legal transplants to
accommodate their legal traditions).
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obviously tailored only at circumstances not extending the boundaries of
a specific exception. 146 Thus, they cannot serve as a general crosscutting
rule of fairness for all situations that might arise in the sphere of
copyright application.

IV. NEW APPROACH: A EUROPEAN “FAIR USE”
GROUNDED IN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The search for possible theoretical models of an E.U. “fair use”
construction might, however, be unnecessary. Surprising as it may seem,
in Europe we might already have some sort of “fair use.” In the course
of the recent years, the courts have gradually shaped it through the
application of the right to freedom of expression and information to
copyright disputes. 147
The fundamental right to freedom of expression is characterized by a
developed list of balancing factors that have been elaborated (just like
American fair use factors) throughout the years of the human rights
jurisprudence in Europe. 148 These factors include: 1) the character of
expression (commercial or not, artistic, etc.); 2) the purpose and nature
of expression/information at stake (political, cultural, entertaining,
otherwise in the general interest); 3) the status of a counterbalanced
interest and the degree of interference with it; 4) availability of alternative
means of accessing the information; 5) the timing/“oldness” of speech;
146. See id. at 11 (considering the need to customize legal transplants, especially when
dealing with case-by-case instances of balancing of fair dealing and fair use).
147. See id. (discussing the influence of the right to freedom of expression and
information on European copyright law); see also Geiger & Izyumenko, Intellectual
Property Before the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 39, at 29-30 (discussing the
intersection of human rights and intellectual property in European law). Christophe
Geiger, L’utilisation jurisprudentielle des droits fondamentaux en Europe en
matière de propriété intellectuelle: Quel apport? Quelles perspectives?, In la
contribution de la jurisprudence à la construction de la propriété intellectuelle
en Europe 193 (Collection du CEIPI/Litec, Paris, 2013) (discussing the intersection
of fundamental rights and intellectual property in the case law of the C.J.E.U.);
Griffiths, Taking Power Tools to the Acquis, supra note 40, at 160; Stijn van Deursen &
Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the Crossroads: Clarifying the Role for Fundamental Rights
in the EU Copyright Framework, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP & COMPETITION L. 1080,
1086-87 (2018).
148. See Geiger & Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the European Court of Human
Rights, supra note 39, at 29-30 (beginning an assessment of freedom of expression as
both a counterweight to and basis for intellectual property rights).
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6) the status of the speaker/user (active or “passive,” press, etc.); 7) the
form of expression; 8) the medium of expression (notably, the Internet);
9) the nature and severity of the penalties; etc. 149
Although these factors have long been shaping the law on freedom of
expression in Europe, it has not been until recently that the courts started
applying them in the copyright context. 150 Viewed from this new
perspective, these old-known factors reveal some striking similarities
with the fairness factors to be found in the U.S. fair use doctrine.
U.S. fair use includes four factors which are non-exhaustive (meaning
that new additional factors can be identified by the courts) and which
split, in turn, into several important subfactors. 151
Factor one is the purpose and character of the use. 152 It encompasses
the following subfactors: commerciality of the use; transformativeness;
and correspondence of the use to one of the preambular purposes or the
purposes analogous to them. 153 Preambular purposes include criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 154
Educational purpose is further identified in the wording of factor one
itself. 155 Non-commercial transformative use for one of the purposes
considered to be socially valuable would tilt towards the finding of fair
149. Id. at 34-37 (providing a case study of these factors informing the decision of a
European court ruling on an intellectual property case).
150. See Griffiths, Taking Power Tools to the Acquis, supra note 40, at 158-59 (discussing
the beginning of European courts applying these factors to copyright law).
151. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1668-69 (1988) (listing four fundamental objectives of the test and beginning an
analysis of their corresponding factors); Leval, supra note 25, at 1110 (listing the four
factors); Beebe, supra note 29, at 594 (acknowledging subfactors within the four main
factors); Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 27, at 2542–44 (asserting that recognizing other
factors in addition to the four statutory ones provides a “toolkit” for assessing a myriad
of possible fair uses); Netanel, supra note 29, at 719–20 (quoting Section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 in defining the four statutory factors). But see Paul Goldstein,
Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 433, 437 (2008) (criticizing the efforts
of courts and jurists in trying to decide how the four factors should be weighted as
undermining their efforts to establish a theory of fair use).
152. See Beebe, supra note 29, at 594, 597 (examining the nature and applicability of
the first factor, “the purpose and character of the use”).
153. See id. at 594, 597 (identifying the subfactors within the first of the main factors).
154. See id. at 609 (listing some of the various types of preambular purposes).
155. See id. at 594, 597 (identifying “educational purposes” as an explicit subfactor
of the first factor).
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use in American case law. 156
Factor two deals with the nature of the copyrighted work. 157 Here
again, two important subfactors stand out: the published or unpublished
nature of the work and its fictional or factual character. 158 More
protection is usually given to creative/fictional works and to works that
have not yet been published (although some case law to the contrary
exists as well). 159
Factor three concerns itself with the amount and substantiality of the
copyrighted work that has been used (quantitatively and qualitatively 160).
Finally, factor four looks at the effects of the use on the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 161 Alongside
transformativeness and commerciality, it is often claimed to be one of
the most influential factors. 162
Some further factors have been identified in addition to the statutory
ones. 163 Those include: the “oldness” of the copyrighted work; refusal to
license; market failure; availability of alternative means (or, almost along
the same lines, necessity or availability of a work to a user); custom;
failure to utilize the technical protection measures; acknowledgement of
source material; good faith or “propriety of the defendant’s conduct;” 164
social desirability of the transfer of use to the defendant; and impact of
156. See id. at 605-06 (evaluating the significance of “transformativeness” as a
subfactor of the first factor).
157. See id. at 610 (assessing the elements and significance of “the nature of the
copyrighted work”).
158. See id. at 610 (distinguishing the two subfactors of “the nature of the
copyrighted work”).
159. See id. at 611–12 (providing a statistical analysis of 306 opinions, which the
article finds suggestive of, but not necessarily proving, causality).
160. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 600
(1985) (showing that taking even small parts of works can be found excessive if it is the
“heart” of the work).
161. See Beebe, supra note 29, at 616.
162. See id. at 616–17 (noting that a distinct majority of court opinions from 1985 to
1994 asserted this proposition).
163. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A.
253 (1983); Fisher, supra note 151; Beebe, supra note 29; Samuelson, Unbundling Fair
Uses, supra note 27; Leval, supra note 25.
164. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-50 (acknowledging good faith as a
longstanding, non-statutory factor).
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an award of fair use on the incentives to create of the plaintiff copyright
owner. 165
In what follows, we compare U.S. fair use factors with Article 10
E.C.H.R. balancing criteria to identify the differences and commonalities
between the two. In turn, this should help in identifying whether
European freedom of expression balancing can serve as a basis for a
European “fair use” construction.

A. CHARACTER OF EXPRESSION
1. Commerciality
The most obvious similarity between U.S. fair use and European
freedom of expression balancing is the commerciality criterion;
commercial or non-profit character of expression under European “fair
use” mirrors the commerciality of the use subfactor under factor one of
U.S. fair use. 166
In the United States, commerciality tilts against fair use but does not
render it presumptively unfair. Thus, in a famous Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music case, which concerned the commercial parody of Roy Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman” by the hip-hop band 2 Live Crew, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered, “the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.” 167 It further noted, “[i]f, indeed,
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the
presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment,
criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‘are
generally conducted for profit in this country.’” 168
In the same spirit, the level of protection under the FoE balancing is
165. See Leval, supra note 25, at 1126–29 (acknowledging the rationale for using two
“false factors;” good faith and artistic integrity).
166. See Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era,
supra note 109, at 116 (providing several cases in which European courts implicitly
consider the commerciality of the expression in dispute to determine whether it
constitutes fair use).
167. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
168. Id. at 584 (citing Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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generally lower for commercial speech, 169 but it is elevated when what is
at stake is not a given individual’s purely “commercial” expression but
her participation in a debate affecting the general interest. 170 The
E.Ct.H.R. judgment in Hertel v. Switzerland is instructive in this regard. 171
Mr. Hertel was an engineer undertaking environmental biological
research in his own laboratory. In 1991, he published a research report
about the hazardous effects on health of microwave ovens. The
Association of Electrical Appliances for Household and Trade in
Switzerland filed a court action against Mr. Hertel claiming that his
research and the subsequent publications thereof in the journals were
untenable and amounted to unfair competition. 172 The Swiss courts
upheld the action, considering that although scientific statements did not
as such fall within the framework of competition, they interfered with
the latter if such statements were employed negatively to influence the
sale of a particular product. As a result, Mr. Hertel was prohibited, under
the threat of punishment, from stating that food that had been prepared
in microwave ovens was hazardous to health. He then applied to the
E.Ct.H.R. claiming that his right to freely express himself had been
violated.
The Strasbourg Court first observed that a margin of appreciation of
169. See Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Federal Republic of Germany,
No. 10572/83, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 33 (1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57648;
Casado Coca v. Spain, No. 15450/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (1994),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57866; Demuth v. Switzerland, No. 38743/97, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 42 (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60724; Mouvement Raëlien
Suisse v. Switzerland, No. 16354/06, ¶ 61 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001112165.
170. See Hertel v. Switzerland, No. 25181/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47 (1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59366; (VgT) Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v.
Switzerland,
No.
24699/94,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶
71
(2001),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59535; Ashby Donald and Others v. France, No.
36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115845.
171. Hertel v. Switzerland, No. 25181/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59366.
172. The relevant provisions of the Federal Unfair Competition Act of 1986 on
which the Association relied did not concern solely economic agents; the Act contained
a general provision, in which were defined as “unfair and illegal,” not only any
commercial practice but also any conduct that was “deceptive or in any other way
offend[ed] the principle of good faith and [ . . . ] affect[ed] relations between
competitors or between suppliers and customers.” See Hertel v. Switzerland, No.
25181/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 25 (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59366.
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the Member States was “particularly essential in commercial matters,
especially in an area as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair
competition.” 173 It was necessary to reduce the extent of that margin in
the applicant’s case since it could not be denied that his participation in
a debate over public health affected the general interest. 174 Taking into
account the other circumstances of the case, 175 the E.Ct.H.R. thus held
that the measure at issue could not be considered “necessary in a
democratic society” and that there had consequently been a violation of
Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on
Human Rights (E.C.H.R.). 176
In the copyright context, to the contrary, the Court did not establish
a violation of Article 10 when it decided two cases where the expression
at stake was considered both primarily commercial and at the same time
not in the public interest.
One case concerned the “commercially run” Pirate Bay file-sharing
service, 177 and the other case concerned an unauthorized publication of
photographs of designers’ clothes “with the specific aim of selling [those
photographs] or providing access in return for payment.” 178 In line with
Hertel logic, the finding of no violation of FoE in these cases rested on a
consideration that the information at stake (music, films, computer
games, and pictures from the fashion shows) fell outside the sphere of
173. Id. at ¶ 47.
174. Id.
175. Notably, Mr. Hertel had nothing to do with editing or writing the publication
in question (he merely sent his research to the journal who then published an article on
its basis); statements definitely attributable to Mr. Hertel were on whole qualified, and
nothing suggested that such statements had any substantial impact on the plaintiff’s
interests; etc.
176. Hertel v. Switzerland, No. 25181/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51 (1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59366.
177. Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117513.
178. Ashby Donald and Others v. France, No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115845. See Geiger & Izyumenko, The Role of
Human Rights in Copyright Enforcement Online, supra note 116 (discussing in further depth
the Ashby Donald and “The Pirate Bay” cases); see generally Alain Strowel, Ponderation entre
liberte d’expression et droit d’auteur sur internet: de la reserve des juges de Strasbourg a une concordance
pratique par les juges de Luxembourg, 100 REV. TRIM. DR. H. no. 2014/100, 889 (2014); Dick
Voorhoof, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information: Implications for Copyright, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331
(Christophe Geiger, ed. 2015).
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general interest, and the commercial nature of the applicants’ expression
only reinforced this finding.
A contrario, both under the FoE balancing and the U.S. fair use
doctrine, commerciality usually loses its significance if the borrowing
expression is artistic or otherwise socially valuable.
2. Transformativeness: Artistic or Otherwise in the “General Interest”
Alongside commerciality, another highly influential subfactor defining
the character of use under factor one of the U.S. fair use doctrine is
transformativeness. Transformativeness includes both an artistic use of
the work and its use for a different purpose than the original. 179 For
example, the Campbell parody analyzed above stands for artistic
transformativeness, whereas the Google Image Search case discussed in
the beginning stands for transformativeness associated with a different
purpose than the original work and the general public good achieved by
such use. 180
In the law on FoE, these two types of transformativeness (which Peter
Yu characterized as “transformative works and transformative uses” 181) are
reflected in the elevated protection given to artistic expression 182 and in
the public interest in imparting and receiving socially valuable
179. See Sag, Predicting Fair Use, supra note 29, at 57 (arguing that “the term
transformative use should be confined to expressive uses of copyrighted works and that
nonexpressive use should be recognized as a distinct category of preferred use”);
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 27, at 2557 (suggesting calling these two
types of uses, respectively, transformative per se and “orthogonal”); see also Matthew Sag,
Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1647 (2009) (stating that
nonexpressive use should be considered equivalent but not identical to transformative
uses of copyrighted work).
180. See Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (discussing parody as
an artistic work that transforms the original into a comedic or otherwise imitative work
that is original in its own right); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th
Cir. 2007) (stating that the public benefit of the transformative nature of Google’s
search engine outweighs the superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails).
181. See Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception be Transplanted Abroad?, 26
INTELL. PROP. J. 175, 189 (2014) (emphasis in the original).
182. See Karataş v. Turkey, No. 23168/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 51-52 (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58274 (finding that the fact that the statements
had been made through poetry rather than in the mass media had led to the conclusion
that the interference with the FoE was not justifiable by the national security context
otherwise existing in the case).
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information in general.
In application to copyright law, a good example of artistic
“transformativeness” and of the role it takes under the FoE “fair use” is
the case on music sampling decided recently in Germany. 183 The
applicants in that case objected to the regular court’s finding that the use
of a two-second sequence of rhythms from the soundtrack of the song
“Metall auf Metall” by the band Kraftwerk in their own music
composition constituted an infringement of the right of phonogram
producers. Finding in favor of the applicants, the German Constitutional
Court held that:
In the legal assessment of use of copyright-protected works, the interest of
the copyright holders to prevent the exploitation of their works without
permission for others’ commercial purposes stands in opposition to the interest
of other artists, which is protected under artistic freedom, to be able to enter into an artistic
dialogue with existing works without financial risk or restrictions on content
within a creative process. 184

The case was then referred back by the German Constitutional Court
to the Federal Court of Justice, which, in turn, referred a number of
questions on this case for a preliminary ruling to the C.J.E.U. 185 The latter
has explicitly regarded the technique of music sampling as “a form of
artistic expression which is covered by freedom of the arts, as protected
in Article 13 of the [E.U.] Charter.” 186 Consequently, according to the
C.J.E.U., artistic freedom has a role to play in shaping the reach of the
right of reproduction: “[W]here a user, in exercising the freedom of the
arts, takes a sound sample from a phonogram in order to use it, in a
modified form unrecognizable to the ear, in a new work, it must be held
183. See
BVerfG,
1
BvR
1585/13,
May
31,
2016,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2016/
05/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html.
184. Id. at ¶ 86 (emphasis added). Translated from German in 48(3) IIC 343 (2017).
185. Pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, if the court of one of the E.U. Member States finds a provision of E.U. law
unclear, it may search for guidance from the C.J.E.U. by requesting the latter to give a
preliminary ruling on the matter. In those situations where the national court is one
against whose decisions no appeal exists under domestic law, that court is obliged to
bring the matter before the C.J.E.U.
186. Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian SchneiderEsleben, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29, 2019), ¶ 35.
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that such use does not constitute ‘reproduction’ within the meaning of
Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29.” 187 Pursuant to the C.J.E.U.:
[T]o regard a sample taken from a phonogram and used in a new work in a
modified form unrecognisable to the ear for the purposes of a distinct artistic
creation, as constituting ‘reproduction’ of that phonogram within the meaning
of Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 would not only run counter to the usual
meaning of that word in everyday language, [ . . . ] but would also fail to meet
the requirement of a fair balance [ . . . ]. 188

In France, in a widely publicized case in which Victor Hugo’s heirs
tried to use the famous author’s moral rights to prevent a sequel to the
work “Les Misérables,” the French Supreme Court likewise gave priority
to the freedom of creation. 189 Citing Article 10 (freedom of expression)
of the E.C.H.R., it held that subject to respect of the right to paternity
and of integrity of the adapted work, freedom of creativity hinders the
author of the work or his heirs from preventing the making of a sequel
after the exploitation monopoly has expired. 190
More recently, in a decision that concerned the creative reuse of three
copyright-protected photographs in a painting, the French Supreme
Court reversed, referring to Article 10 E.C.H.R., the lower court’s finding
of an infringement on the ground of the Appeal Court’s failure to show
how exactly the fair balance between the freedom of artistic expression
and the copyright-holder’s interests had been achieved. 191
187. Id. at ¶ 31.
188. Id. at ¶ 37.
189. See Christophe Geiger, Copyright and the Freedom to Create – A Fragile Balance, 38
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 710 (2007).
190. See id.
191. French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), no. 13-27391, May 15 2015,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=J
URITEXT000030600576&fastReqId=328890726&fastPos=1. Note, however, that in
a judgment of March 16 2018 (Malka v. Klasen, RG No 15/06029) the court to which
the case was referred back (Versailles Court of Appeal) held that the use of the
photograph in a painting was not sufficiently transformative and amounted therefore
to an infringement. It also found that neither the parody exception nor freedom of
expression covered the use at issue. See Christophe Geiger, Appropriation créative et droit
d’auteur, Réflexions sur les évolutions récentes de la jurisprudence française à la lumière du droit de
l’Union et du droit comparé, in Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Claude Witz 325 (Paris,
LexisNexis, 2018). Interestingly, in a similar case from Sweden that involved likewise
an artistic reuse of the copyrighted photograph in a painting, the Swedish Supreme
Court found that the use was sufficiently transformative and thus constituted a new and
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By recognizing a higher protection for freedom of artistic creativity
within the framework of FoE, the courts in Europe thus establish a
balancing mechanism analogous to the transformativeness subfactor of
U.S. fair use.
Artistic expression as an expression in the general interest that
overshadows the significance of other factors, including commerciality,
was also considered in a number of trademark and design cases. One of
the most frequently discussed is the case of “Darfurnica” decided by the
District Court of The Hague in 2011. 192 The case arose out of a dispute
between the Danish/Dutch artist Nadia Plesner and Louis Vuitton over
the painting “Darfurnica” (inspired by Picasso’s Guernica). A part of that
paining (titled “Simple Living”) depicted a starving African child holding
a Louis Vuitton handbag. The aim was to “draw attention to the poignant
difference between luxury and affluence on the one hand and poverty
and famine in Darfur on the other hand.” 193 Within the framework of an
exhibition at which “Darfurnica” was shown and offered for sale, a
number of T-shirts and posters depicting “Simple Living” were sold. 194
“Darfurnica” was also used as an eye-catcher on Plesner’s website. 195
Louis Vuitton objected to the use of its famous design-protected pattern
on the ground of a potential damage to its reputation and requested an
ex parte order against Plesner and the gallery that organized the

independent creation not infringing on the copyright in the original photograph
(Swedish Supreme Court, “Swedish scapegoats,” No. T 1963-15, 21 Feb. 2017). The court
has made no reference in this case, however, to the right to freedom of expression of
the secondary user. At the same time, the stress of both French and Swedish courts on
transformativeness in the context of creative reuses of works (although with different
outcomes) points to the emergence of a quasi-fair use standard in European copyright.
192. See Plesner v. Louis Vuitton, Court of the Hague Civil Law Section, application
number KG RK 10-214, Jan. 27, 2011 [Kennedy van der Laan trans]
http://www.rechtundgerechtigkeit.de/2-4-gesellschaftsanktionen/berichte/vuittondarfurnica/belege/Court_Order_Louis_Vuitton_vs_Plesner.pdf; Jani McCutcheon,
Designs, Parody, and Artistic Expression – A Comparative Perspective of Plesner v. Louis Vuitton,
41 MONASH U. L. REV. 189, 195 (2015) (discussing in depth the case of Plesner v. Louis
Vuitton and its implications); see also Lucie Guibault, The Netherlands: Darfurnica, Miffy and
the Right to Parody, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 236, 237 (2011)
(discussing in depth the case of Plesner v. Louis Vuitton).
193. Plesner v. Louis Vuitton, Court of the Hague Civil Law Section, application
number KG RK 10-214, Jan. 27, 2011, ¶ 2.3.
194. Id. at ¶ 2.2.
195. Id.
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exhibition. 196 The Dutch court rejected the request, reasoning,
Opposite Louis Vuitton’s fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of its
exclusive rights to the use of the design, there is, according to established case
law of the European Court of Human Rights, the fundamental right of Plesner
that is high in a democratic society’s priority list to express her opinion
through her art. In this respect it applies that artists enjoy a considerable
protection with regard to their artistic freedom. 197

Importantly, in the light of this artistic character of the use, it could
not be deemed to serve “a mere commercial purpose.” 198
Analogously, in the case from Germany that concerned the ironic use
of trademarks and advertising campaigns of a famous chocolate producer
Milka on commercially distributed postcards, the German Federal Court
of Justice gave precedence to the freedom of art over the potential
damage to the interests of a trademark holder. 199
Artistic (and, in the Dutch case, also societal) filling of the messages
at stake in these cases outweighed their commercial character,
demonstrating once again that commerciality does not, analogous to U.S.
fair use, have a final say under the FoE balancing. In other words, the
profit-making considerations, although important, might not be decisive.
What is required is the speech’s contribution to the general public
interest.
As it concerns non-artistic uses for a different purpose than the
original, such as the use of copyrighted data in machine learning, for the
operation of search engines or in other instances of text and data mining,
those are likely to be considered “fair” both under the U.S. fair use
doctrine and the FoE balancing as uses in the general public interest.
Importantly, certain uses can bear the features of both artistic and
“different purpose” transformativeness, as was the case with Nadia
196. Id.
197. See Rechtbank‘s-Gravenhage, 4 mei 2011, KG ZA, 11-294 m.nt. ¶ 4.8 (Neth.).
198. Id. See also Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International (Finance)
B.V. t/a Sabmark International, 2006 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 38 (S. Afr.) (finding that a parody
on a T-shirt can still be an expression worth protection even if the T-shirt is sold).
199. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Feb. 3, 2005, I ZR
159/02
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh
&Art=en&nr=32899&pos=0&anz=1 (Ger.).
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Plesner’s use of Louis Vuitton’s protected design. The Court of The
Hague has recognized that the use in question, apart from being
obviously artistic (incorporation in the painting), was likewise fostering
an important general interest of attracting the public’s attention to the
drastic situation in Darfur. At the same time, the use did not “free ride
with Louis Vuitton’s reputation in a commercial sense.” 200

B. PURPOSE OF EXPRESSION
Factor one of U.S. fair use looks, apart from the character of the use
(which can be commercial or not, transformative or consumptive), at the
purpose of the use. 201 As already mentioned, prioritized purposes under
U.S. fair use doctrine include Section 107 preambular purposes (criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research) and any
other analogous use that, in the broader sense, is in society’s interest. 202
The FoE balancing likewise takes the purpose of use/expression into
account. It distinguishes political speech and speech in the general public
interest among the two prioritized fields of the freedom of expression
protection. 203
Whereas political expression is by far not the most frequent use with
which the copyright law is concerned (although the cases on political
“fair use” do arise too), the same is not true with regards to the use in
the general public interest, which arguably comprises all of the statutory
purposes listed under American fair use.
200. Plesner v. Louis Vuitton, Court of the Hague Civil Law Section, application
number KG RK 10-214, Jan. 27, 2011, ¶ 4.8.
201. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivatives Work Right, 31 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 101, 102 (2008) (stating that the transformativeness of a derivative work
may give it completely different purpose and character of the use, which is the first
factor in U.S. fair use).
202. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990) (stating the preambular purposes
of the American fair use doctrine).
203. Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), No. 26682/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58279; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v.
France, Nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 46 (2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-82846; Axel Springer AG v. Germany, No.
39954/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 90 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034;
Morice v. France, No. 29369/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 125 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-154265; Bédat v. Switzerland, No. 56925/08, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161898.
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To give just a few examples, in Cengiz and Yıldırım, transmission of
academic materials (thus serving educational and teaching purposes)
constituted a factor favoring the freedom of expression finding. 204 To the
contrary, the use of the “pirate” websites to access music, films, and
other analogous content, when other means of access were available
without entailing a breach of copyright, was ruled by the E.Ct.H.R. to be
outside of the sphere of general public interest. 205
Alongside education, criticism 206 and news reporting 207 also rank
highly on the FoE balancing scale.
In application to other areas of I.P., such as trademarks and designs,
matters of public interest were ruled to include artistic use of a famous
fashion brand to criticize the culture of consumerism, 208 a parody of a
well-known cigarette mark to draw attention to the health risks of
smoking, 209 parodic uses of the companies’ logos to highlight the risks to
the environment resulting from these companies’ activities or
products, 210 criticism of the social policy of these players in the
economy, 211 or simple ironic use of the companies’ trademarks and
204. See Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50
(2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159188; Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, No.
3111/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115705.
205. See Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117513; Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), No. 20877/10,
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 25-26 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-9493.
206. Criticism under the U.S. fair use doctrine though presupposes the criticism of
original work, whereas the notion of criticism under the law on FoE concerns rather
more tolerated levels of criticism towards governmental, political, and other public
figures or practices. See Onder Bakircioglu, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech, 16
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 43 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of allowing
criticism of government officials).
207. News reporting purpose is reflected through the higher level of the FoE
protection traditionally accorded to the press and journalists. See discussion infra Part
IV, Section F on the status of the “speaker”.
208. See Rechtbank‘s-Gravenhage, 4 mei 2011, KG ZA 2011, 11-294 m.nt. (Neth.).
209. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct.
19, 2006, Bull. Civ. II, No. 1601 (Fr.) (finding that parody was allowed when it came to
parodying “Camel” products as part of a campaign to denounce smoking).
210. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Apr. 8,
2008, Bull. civ. IV, No. 06–10961 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., Apr.8, 2008, Bull. Civ. I, No. 07-11.251 (Fr.).
211. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, D. 2003, Apr. 30, 2003, AJ
1760 (Fr.).

2019]

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN "FAIR USE"

47

advertising campaigns to advance the user’s own marketing interests. 212

C. NATURE OF INFORMATION
1. Entertainment and the Value of Information
Factor two of U.S. fair use draws the line between factual and fictional
or, put differently, informational and entertaining nature of the
copyrighted work. More protection is usually given to creative, fictional
works, whereas the factual/informational ones cut in favor of fair use.
A generally higher level of copyright protection for the works of
entertainment under the U.S. fair use doctrine somewhat mirrors a
generally lower level of FoE safeguards for such information when
compared with political or otherwise “social” expression. Pure
entertainment is, however, not excluded from the FoE coverage; the
Strasbourg Court has stated that its importance, alongside cultural
expressions, should not be disregarded. 213
One example is the E.Ct.H.R. case of Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi
v. Sweden. 214 The applicants, an immigrant family residing in Sweden,
complained that they were evicted from their rented flat following a
refusal to remove a satellite dish. This amounted, according to them, to
an unjustified interference with their freedom to receive information as
the satellite dish allowed the family to watch television programs in their
mother tongues (Arabic and Farsi) from their country of origin (Iraq).
The Court agreed, observing that the information the applicants wished
to receive included political, social, and cultural news and programs that
could be of particular interest to them as immigrants from Iraq. 215 The
E.Ct.H.R. noted further that, apart from this “general interest”
information, the applicants also wished to have access to the entertaining
content. With regards to this latter type of information, the Court stated
that “the freedom to receive information does not extend only to reports
212. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 3, 2005, I ZR 159/02,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=32899&pos=0&anz=1
; see, e.g., Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression, supra note 85.
213. Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, No. 23883/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 44
(2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90234.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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of events of public concern but covers in principle cultural expressions
as well as pure entertainment. The importance of the latter types of information should
not be underestimated, especially for an immigrant family with three children,
who may wish to maintain contact with the culture and language of their
country of origin. The right at issue was therefore of particular importance
to the applicants.” 216
Whether the entertainment is included in the scope of the right to
information and which level of protection it attains is influential. Much
of the debate on copyright in the E.U. is now centered on the platforms
that make the films, music, and other entertaining content available
online for free download or streaming. The ways to regulate these
practices in a manner that would not result in “[e]very day citizens . . .
across the E.U. break[ing] the law just to do something
commonplace,” 217 and fairly reward the creators, is still looming in legal
uncertainty. Both the U.S. fair use doctrine and European FoE balancing,
however, still share the general confusion as to “whether defendant’s
work serves the public interest if it is primarily entertainment.” 218 As
Wendy Gordon notes, “[s]ome courts [in the U.S.] have suggested that
entertainment has a social value, while [others] . . . demanded that
defendant show some additional claim to serving the public.” 219 Similarly,
despite the E.Ct.H.R.’s pronouncements on the importance of cultural
and entertaining expression that “should not be underestimated,” 220 in
two cases on copyright decided by the Court in 2013, an entertaining
nature of information did not seem to tilt, at least to some extent,
towards the “fair use” finding.
One such case mentioned above concerned a conviction in France of
the three fashion photographers for copyright infringement following
the taking of photographs of designers’ clothes at fashion shows and
their subsequent unauthorized publication online. Responding to the
photographers’ claim of violation of their freedom to impart
information, the Court stated, “although one cannot deny that the public
is interested in fashion in general and haute couture fashion shows in
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Press Release, supra note 52.
218. Gordon, supra note 163, at 300.
219. Id. at 301.
220. Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, No. 23883/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 44
(2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90234.
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particular, it could not be said that the applicants took part in a debate of
general interest when restricting themselves to making photographs of
fashion shows accessible to the public.” 221 It is noticeable that the
E.Ct.H.R. did not give any reason why the fashion shows should be left
outside the matters of general interest. This is all the more interesting in
view of the fact that this same case has also made its way to the U.S.
courts, where it was found at lower instance that:
The subject matter of protected expression extends beyond the political to
include matters of cultural import. . . . Fashion shows are a matter of great public
interest, for artistic as well as commercial purposes. These shows are open to the
public, including the press . . . and the extensive coverage given to such events
in various mass media makes clear that there is widespread public interest in these
matters . . . The First Amendment simply does not permit plaintiffs to stage
public events in which the general public has a considerable interest and then
control the way in which information about those events is disseminated in
the mass media. 222

Another case in which the entertaining nature of information was not
arguably given sufficient consideration (and which was also discussed
briefly in the previous sections) was brought to the Strasbourg Court by
the co-founders of a notorious Pirate Bay file-sharing service who were
convicted in Sweden for complicity to commit crimes for furthering the
other persons’ infringement of copyright. 223 When considering the type
of information at issue (that largely consisted, in fact, of entertainment –
music, films, and computer games), the Court simply underlined that,
“although protected by Article 10, the safeguards afforded to the
distributed material . . . cannot reach the same level as that afforded to
political expression and debate.” 224
Thus, although admitting in theory the importance of protecting
221. Ashby Donald and Others v. France, No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115845. See Geiger & Izyumenko, Copyright on the
Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 109.
222. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 489 F.3d 474 (2nd Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (finding that the lower
court failed to conduct the full analysis necessary to reach the conclusion that
Viewfinder’s First Amendment rights were violated).
223. Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117513.
224. Id. See also Geiger & Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note
109, at 320 (analyzing in detail “The Pirate Bay” and Ashby Donald decisions).
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cultural and entertaining expressions, the E.Ct.H.R. in practice still often
falls into the generalized statements on the higher levels of protection
for political speech, which seem to downplay any added value of the
recognition of some level of protection behind entertainment. 225 The
situation is largely the same in the United States in relation to the
inclusion of entertainment in the scope of fair use – persisting confusion
that does not benefit to clearing the situation in which laws do not
correspond to the everyday practices of the majority of the population. 226
Before moving any further, another important observation on the
distinction between the fictional/factual subfactor of U.S. fair use and
European FoE balancing is due here. It is noticeable that, unlike in the
case of American fair use, the law on FoE does not grant elevated
protection to factual information per se. It deals with the “quality” or
social utility of such information. It does not preoccupy itself with
making the facts as such (even those devoid of evident significance in
terms of the general societal interest) available to the public. In other
words, higher protection of the right to receive information about the
facts would directly depend, under the FoE analysis, on the social value
of such facts.
This is because the law on FoE makes the level of protection
dependent not on the nature of the work but on the nature of
information at stake. 227 This might prove problematic for the foundation
225. It is worth noting that neither in the case of the photographers nor in “The Pirate
Bay” did the character of expression inclined in favour of “fair use;” the use was not for
political, artistic, or similar purposes and had a commercial motivation at its core.
226. See Press Release, supra note 52.
227. It is important to distinguish, in addition, the nature of information under the FoE
balancing from the character of expression or use – a distinction which is somewhat
mirrored in the U.S. fair use division between the character of the use under factor one
and the nature of the copyrighted work under factor two. There is a possibility, for
example, that information (subject matter) that is not political by its nature is used in a
political way – in other words, to transmit a political message. See, e.g., Case C-201/13,
Deckmyn, et al. v. Vandersteen, et al., 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶¶ 19–23 (Sept. 3,
2014) (showing that non-political content (cover of the children’s book) was used to
deliver a political message). The different levels of protection existing for different types
of expression (political, artistic, cultural, or otherwise socially valuable) thus equally apply,
as a separate factor, to the different types of information targeted by that expression.
Taking “Darfurnica” again as an example, as it concerned the character of expression
in that case, it was both artistic and of a socially important, primarily not commercial,
character. The nature of information used to deliver the artist’s message concerned,
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for copyright idea/expression distinction – i.e. the concept that ideas or
facts are not protected by copyright and only their particular form of
expression is. There is no place under the idea/expression dichotomy for
a qualitative assessment of the facts. Arguably, only expression has to
pass a certain qualitative test – originality. 228
Nevertheless, at times an elevated deference to the nature of
information (such as political news) can be traced in the U.S. fair use
context alike. Thus, in Harper & Row, the Court of Appeals was especially
influenced by the “politically significant” nature of the subject matter of
President Ford’s unpublished memoirs accounting for an important
historical event. 229 The Court’s conviction was that it is not “the purpose
of the Copyright Act to impede that harvest of knowledge so necessary
to a democratic state.” 230
A separate subfactor under the nature of information evaluation in
FoE balancing is the target of speech. The speech about politicians and
other public figures has higher permissibility levels and hence tilts in
favor of “fair use.” 231 In application to I.P., this logic was extended
moreover, a well-known brand – the use which could be equated, for the FoE purposes,
to the speech about a prominent political figure. See Rechtbank‘s-Gravenhage, 4 mei 2011,
KG ZA 2011, 11-294 m.nt. (Neth.), ¶ 4.9. By contrast, in the case of the fashion
photographers from France, the use was not primarily artistic; photographers merely
transmitted the pictures to the public with no intention of creating their own “art” by
the photographs. See Ashby Donald and Others v. France, No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115845. Nor was it for a socially valuable
purpose. See Dirk Voorhoof and Inger Høedt-Rasmussen, Copyright vs. Freedom of
Expression
Judgment,
ECHR
BLOG
(Jan.
22,
2013),
http://echrblog.blogspot.fr/2013/01/copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression.html (“It
would undoubtedly have been different if the pictures posted on the Internet had
contributed to a public debate e.g. on women’s rights in the world of fashion or on
public health issues related to anorexia and young girls being tempted to look like
models in the glossy fashion magazines.”).
228. See generally Eleanora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonization through
Case Law (Edward Elgar, 2013) (discussing how the originality of a work distinguishes
the level of protection awarded to the work).
229. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir.
1983) (discussing, most notably, President Ford’s decision to pardon the former
president, Richard Nixon).
230. Id. at 208. The Supreme Court was, however, much more reluctant to discuss
this factor, although it did not overturn its relevance either. See also Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 545-46.
231. See Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, No. 2034/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103951 (“[T]he limits of acceptable criticism are

52

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:1

towards speech concerning well-known companies and brands. For
example, in the above-discussed “Darfurnica” case concerning the use
of the Louis Vuitton’s design-protected pattern in an artistic work critical
of the culture of consumerism, the Dutch court observed that “[t]he
circumstance that Louis Vuitton is a very well-known company, the
products of which enjoy a considerable reputation, which it also
stimulates through advertising famous people, . . . implies that Louis
Vuitton must accept critical use . . . to a stronger degree than other
rightholders.” 232
2. Published/Unpublished Status of the Work and the Timing of Expression
Apart from fictional/factual nature of the copyrighted work, factor
two of U.S. fair use also distinguishes between the published or
unpublished status of a work. 233 This subfactor does not have an explicit
analogue under the European FoE balancing, although an indirect
European peer to the subfactor could be found in the factor dealing with
the timing of expression. 234 Thus, in Leroy v. France, the fact that the
caricature of the September 11th attack on the twin towers in the U.S.
was published shortly after the tragedy (two days after), “when the whole
world was shocked by the news,” 235 played a role in finding that the
national courts’ conviction of the caricaturist for complicity in condoning
terrorism did not infringe on his right to freedom of expression.
wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the
latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his
every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must
consequently display a greater degree of tolerance [ . . . ]. He is certainly entitled to have
his reputation protected, even when he is not acting in his private capacity, but the
requirements of that protection have to be weighed against the interests of open
discussion of political issues, since exceptions to freedom of expression must be
interpreted narrowly [ . . . ]. The Court has also acknowledged that public officials are
subject to wider limits of criticism than private individuals, although the criteria applied
to them cannot be the same as for politicians [ . . . ].”).
232. See Rechtbank‘s-Gravenhage, 4 mei 2011, KG ZA 2011, 11-294 m.nt. (Neth.), ¶ 4.8
(emphasis added); Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, No. 68416/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 94
(2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68224.
233. See Bruce Keller & Jeffrey Cunard, Copyright Law: A Practitioner’s Guide 8–19, 20
(2d ed. 2015) (explaining the distinction the Supreme Court made between unpublished
and published works and subsequent Congressional action in the Copyright Act).
234. See Leroy v. France, No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88657.
235. Id. at ¶ 45.
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According to the Court, “this temporal dimension was intended to increase
the responsibility of the [caricaturist].” 236 By analogy, it is not impossible
to envisage that unauthorized use of a copyrighted material that has not
yet been published would increase the responsibility of the user under
Article 10 E.C.H.R. just as it increases such responsibility under factor
two of the U.S. fair use doctrine.
Similarly, in Éditions Plon v. France, 237 the E.Ct.H.R. held that even
though both the temporary and permanent bans on the distribution of a
book about President Mitterrand’s physical condition were prescribed by
law and pursued a legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the President
and his heirs, the decision to maintain the ban indefinitely – in view of
the time that had elapsed since François Mitterrand’s death and
availability of the book on the Internet – was no longer compatible with
freedom of expression and therefore resulted in a violation of Article 10
E.C.H.R. 238
The time-factor was also considered by the Slovak Constitutional
Court in its first case on copyright and FoE. 239 The case revolved around
the use by the local newspaper of an iconic “Tank Man” photograph
taken by the young Slovak photographer Ladislav Bielik in 1968. 240 The
photograph, which depicted the Soviet occupation of former
Czechoslovakia, was used by the newspaper in question in 2003 and 2005
repeatedly without attribution and with no authorization from Ladislav
Bielik’s heirs who held the rights in the photograph. 241 The courts at all
instances ruled in favor of the rightholders having considered that,
contrary to what the newspaper claimed, the copyright did subsist in the
photograph and that the news reporting exception did not apply in this
case. 242 At the final instance, the FoE argument was also raised by the

236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Éditions Plon v. France, No. 58148/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61760.
238. Parallels can also be drawn with such U.S. non-statutory factors that are
sometimes advanced in the doctrine, as the “age” of the work. See, e.g., Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 27, at 2541-42.
239. See Uznesenie Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky 30.9.2014 [Resolution of
the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic] II. ÚS 647/2014, ¶ 17.
240. Id. at ¶ 1.
241. Id. at ¶ 7.
242. Id. at ¶¶ 11–14.
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newspaper. 243 In rejecting this claim too, the Slovak Constitutional Court
paid attention, among other factors, to the timing of expression. 244
According to it, there was no time pressure in publishing the photograph,
which appeared for the first time back in 1968. 245 The newspaper could
thus have first tried to obtain a license from the rightholders. 246 It follows
that the time factor can tilt, in analogous circumstances, against “fair
use,” as the duty of the user to initially attempt to acquire a license is even
more strict with respect to the information on past events in relation to
which no urgency exists. 247
The alternative means factor discussed in subsequent sections can also
play its role here. Although, in the majority of U.S. fair use cases where
an unpublished status of the work would cut against fair use, some
jurisprudential examples to the contrary do exist too. 248 Thus, at times
the U.S. courts were ruling that an unpublished status of the work favored
fair use because otherwise the work was not available to the public, and
vice versa – when the work was published, it tilted against fair use
because the work was available for purchase, and thus a reasonable
alternative to infringing use existed. 249 This alludes to the Article 10
243. Id. at ¶ 16.
244. Id. at ¶ 49. See Martin Husovec, Tank Man hits the Constitutional Court, KLUWER
COPYRIGHT
BLOG
(Apr.
6,
2015),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2015/04/06/tank-man-hits-theconstitutional-court/.
245. Uznesenie Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky 30.9.2014, II. ÚS 647/2014, ¶
49.
246. Id.
247. A comparison can be drawn here with a higher responsibility of the journalists
to verify the accuracy of the published information if such information relates to the
past events. See Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos. 1 and 2) v. United Kingdom, Nos. 3002/03 and
23676/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-91706.
(“[T]he duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible
journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information
published is likely to be more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the
material.”).
248. See Beebe, supra note 29, at 613–15 (comparing the majority and the contrary
positions regarding a work’s unpublished nature as it relates to fair use).
249. See id. at 613-14 (“[I]n the opinions studied, the fact that the plaintiff’s work was
unpublished appears to have exerted no significant effect on the outcome of the fair
use test, but the fact that the plaintiff’s work was published appears to have exerted a
strong effect on the outcome of the test in favor of a finding of fair use.” (emphasis in
the original)).
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consideration on the availability of alternative means of access to
information, 250 which thus can also be considered as a factor covering, in
Europe, what in the United States constitutes the separate subfactor of
factor two.

D. IMPACT ON THE PROPERTY OF THE RIGHTHOLDER
Under the freedom of expression balancing, an important
consideration is given to the degree of interference with copyrighted
property, which the freedom of expression use has caused. 251 Quite
similarly, the U.S. fair use doctrine analyzes the impact of the use on
copyrighted property under factor four, termed as “the effect of the use
on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”. 252
In the above-discussed case of “Metall auf Metall” from Germany on
music sampling, courts considered the degree of interference with
property of copyright holders as a factor in the FoE analysis. 253 As noted
by the German Federal Constitutional Court in that case, “[i]f the artist’s
freedom of creative expression is measured against an interference with
copyright which only slightly limits the possibilities of exploitation, the
exploitation interests of copyright owners may have to cede in favor of
the freedom of artistic debate.” 254 The C.J.E.U. in its recent judgment on
250. See Akdeniz v. Turkey, No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-9493; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 48226/10
and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159188.
(considering the availability of alternative means of access to information). See infra Part
IV, Section E.
251. Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, No. 16354/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165.
252. 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2019).
253. BVerfG,
1
BvR
1585/13,
May
21,
2016,
at
12,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html.
254. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). As outlined above, this position was not shared by
the Advocate General of the C.J.E.U. in his opinion on this case. According to the
Advocate General, “[a]rtists must be particularly aware of the limits and restrictions that
life imposes on creative freedom where they concern the rights and fundamental
freedoms of others, in particular their right to property, including intellectual property.
[ . . . ] I am not of the opinion that the freedom of the arts [ . . . ] requires the
introduction or recognition of an exception [ . . . ] which covers uses such as those at
issue in the main proceedings, in which the works or other subject-matter are used, not
for purposes of interaction, but rather in the creation of new works bearing no relation
to the pre-existing works. The requirement of obtaining a licence for such use does not
restrict, in my opinion, the freedom of the arts to a degree that extends beyond normal
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this case has also referred to the degree of an interference with property
of the rightholder as a factor to be taken into account. 255 By applying this
criterion, the C.J.E.U. appears to follow the German Constitutional
Court, insofar as the Luxemburg Court considers that “sampling would
not interfere with the opportunity which the producer has of realizing
satisfactory returns on his or her investment.” 256
Analogously, in another decision from Germany, “Germania 3,” which
concerned the refusal of the heirs of Bertolt Brecht to allow the use of
passages from a play by their ancestor for insertion in a new play to
permit a critical analysis in artistic form of some of his theories, the
German Constitutional Court gave precedence to the freedom to create
laid down in Article 5(3) (artistic freedom) of the German Basic Law over
“a minor infringement of copyright that only involved a minimal financial
loss for the right holders.” 257 The German Constitutional Court thus
considered, within the FoE analysis for these cases, the factor known in
the United States as the impact of the use on the market for a work.
When the FoE use is more intrusive, however, the property interests
are likely to prevail. For instance, in the E.Ct.H.R. case of Appleby, the
applicants were stopped from setting up a stand and distributing leaflets
in the shopping mall by the private company that owned the mall. 258 The
applicants complained that their right to FoE was thereby violated,
maintaining that the State owed a positive obligation to secure the
exercise of their rights within the mall despite that the dispute concerned
the relationships between private parties. Although the Strasbourg Court
market constraints, especially since those new works often generate significant revenue
for their authors and producers. So far as concerns the argument that, in certain cases,
obtaining a licence may prove impossible, for example in the event that the rightholders
refuse, I take the view that the freedom of the arts cannot guarantee the possibility of
free use of whatever is wanted for creative purposes.” (Opinion of Advocate General
Szpunar in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hutter, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, ¶¶
94, 96 (Dec. 12, 2018)).
255. Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian SchneiderEsleben, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX (July 29, 2019), ¶ 38.
256. Id.
257. BVerfG,
1
BvR
825/98,
June
25,
2000,
¶
24,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/e/rk20000629_1bvr082598.html
(emphasis added).
258. Appleby and Others v. United Kingdom, No. 44306/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61080.
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agreed that the positive obligation might have existed in the present
case, 259 it was:
[N]ot persuaded that . . . demographic, social, economic, and technological
developments [that] are changing the ways in which people move around and
come into contact with each other . . . require[] the automatic creation of rights
of entry to private property. . . . Where, however, the bar on access to property
has the effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expression
or it can be said that the essence of the right has been destroyed, the Court
would not exclude that a positive obligation could arise for the State to protect
the enjoyment of the Convention rights by regulating property rights. 260

As the Court’s reasoning in this case demonstrates, the impact of the
FoE use on the property of the rightsholder is a sensitive consideration,
which will depend on the circumstances of each case – largely in line with
the U.S. jurisprudence on the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine. 261
One important difference exists when assessing the impact on the
property of copyright holder from the U.S. fair use and European FoE
balancing perspectives. As already mentioned above, no remuneration to
the rightholder is envisaged under the U.S. fair use doctrine. 262 To the
contrary, the FoE balancing leaves sufficient room for allowing the uses
against the payment of fair remuneration to the rightsholder – the fact
permitting, arguably, an extension of the scope of permissible uses that,
if the fair remuneration not existed, would have fallen under the scope
of “unfair.” 263 In other words, the payment of remuneration arguably
259. Id. at ¶ 41.
260. Id. at ¶ 47 (emphasis added).
261. Id. See also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1275, n.32 (11th
Cir. 2001).
262. See Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, supra note 31, at 1385 (defining fair use within
copyright cases).
263. When balancing freedom of expression with the right to property (including
property of copyright holders), the E.Ct.H.R. takes into account the severity of
interference not only with freedom of expression, but also with the countervailing
property interest. See, e.g., Appleby and Others v. United Kingdom, No. 44306/98, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 47 (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61080; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse
v.
Switzerland,
No.
16354/06,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶
58
(2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165. In application to copyright law, this
principle was recognized, for example, by the German Federal Constitutional Court in
its famous “Schoolbook” decision. As held by the court in that case, although it should
be possible to limit the author’s exclusive right if important public interests require so,
the remuneration may be avoided only in the rarest cases. BVerfG, 1 BvR 765/66, July
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mitigates the density of the FoE’s conflict with property of copyright
owner and thereby increases the chances that the FoE-based use would
prevail (and “fair use” will accordingly be found). 264
7,
1971,
http://www.unileipzig.de/urheberrecht/ressrc/material/vorles/grur/grur72-481.pdf (“With the
exclusion of the author’s right to prohibit access, the public interest in having access to
the cultural assets is satisfied sufficiently; this exclusion clearly defines the social
obligation of copyright in this decisive area. It does not follow from Article 14
paragraph 2 of the Constitution, however, that in these cases, the author would have to
make his intellectual asset available to the general public free of charge.”). See generally
Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, supra note 4, at 540–41
(discussing the German Federal Constitutional Court’s use of limitation-based
remuneration).
264. In the same line of thought, authors suggest that compulsory licensing, statutory
licences, and fair remuneration can present a way of mitigating the conflict with FoE
without unnecessarily intruding on the remuneration interests of rightholders. See
Gustavo Ghidini & Andrea Stazi, Freedom to Conduct a Business, Competition and Intellectual
Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 410, 419 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) (observing that a proper balance
between third parties’ access rights and rightholders’ due reward can be achieved “not
only ex ante, through compulsory, extended, or voluntary public licenses, but also ex
post, by applying the liability rule, as a reasonable remuneration instead of full damages,
when the property rule appears too strict at the stage of enforcement, e.g. in worthy
cases of derivative innovation or creation”); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright and
Free Expression: Engine or Obstacle?, in COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI STUDY DAYS 253–54 (Raquel Xalbarder ed., 2006) (“If
we accept the premise that a particular act controlled by the copyright owner should be
something that third parties should be able to do in order to exercise free speech rights,
should it matter that the third party must pay to do so? . . . If payment is not a threat to
free speech, then we need only modify our rules on injunctions. The way we answer
this question affects the extent to which the availability of licenses (compulsory or
voluntary) can ameliorate impediments and allow us to navigate between engines and
obstacles.”); Varsha Mangal, Is Fair Use Actually Fair? Analyzing Fair Use and the Potential
for Compulsory Licensing in Authors Guild v. Google, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 251, 273–74
(2016) (“Fair use acts as an ‘on/off’ switch, which forces one party to be a winner and
the other party to be a loser. However, as fair use is applied to benefit the public,
sometimes the burden on the losing party is simply too great. Therefore, a different
legal avenue ought to be pursued,” which according to the author, compulsory licensing
provides.); Neil Weinstock Netanel, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 208 (Oxford Univ. Press,
2008) (“[I]t would serve free speech policy to convert copyright from a right of
proprietary control to a right to receive compensation. Copyright law should not serve
as a tool for media incumbents or for media-licensed distributors of digital content . . .
to parlay mass media dominance into digital markets. Nor should copyright be available
to supress the wellspring of peer-created remixes and mashups that digital technology
makes possible. At the same time, neither should untrammelled file sharing be allowed
to eviscerate revenues for creators and media firms that look to the market for
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E. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESSING THE INFORMATION
Yet another important point of correlation between the U.S. fair use
and European FoE balancing is the alternative means factor. 265 Both in
the United States and in Europe, the availability of the work to the user
is influential for the fair use finding. 266 Although in the United States this
is not one of the statutory factors, its relevance to fair use, as explained
by Wendy Gordon, “is implicitly reflected in the legislative history of
section 107 of the Copyright Act. The Senate Report to the [then] new
copyright act states that ‘[a] key, though not necessarily determinative,
factor in fair use is whether or not the work is available to the potential
user.’” 267
Put more generally, if no other means of accessing the copyrighted
work exists and the only access that is available is somehow
disproportionately problematic (excessively high price, refusal to license,
etc.), this tilts in favor of fair use. 268
sustenance and a degree of editorial independence.”). See Geiger, Statutory Licenses as
Enabler of Creative Uses, supra note 32, at 305 (discussing statutory licences and limitationbased remuneration rights as an “interesting tool [ . . . ] for legislators in order to avoid
the blocking effect of exclusivity, while at the same time ensuring that the creator can
participate fairly in the creative reuse of their works”); see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz &
Joao Pedro Quintais, Towards a Universal Right of Remuneration: Legalizing the Non–
Commerical Online Use of Works, in COPYRIGHT RECONSTRUCTED: RETHINKING
COPYRIGHT’S ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN A TIME OF HIGHLY DYNAMIC TECHNOLOGICAL
AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 241, 263-268 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz, ed., Wolters Kluwer
2018).
265. See Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet
Governance, 52 EMORY L. J. 187, 264–65 (2003) (discussing the use of the alternative
means factor in various cases); Geiger & Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright
Enforcement Online, supra note 116, at 72 (discussing the use of the alternative means
factor in relation to Article 10 E.C.H.R.).
266. Compare Gordon, supra note 163, at 1627–28 (citing a Senate Report stating that
“the new copyright act states that ‘[a] key, though not necessarily determinative, factor
in fair use is whether or not the work is available to the potential user,’ so that the outof-print status of a copyrighted work may help to justify fair use”), with Akdeniz v.
Turkey, No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0029493 (ruling that since the applicant could without difficulty have had access to a range
of musical works by numerous means without breaching copyright rules, the applicant
was not injured in order to have standing).
267. See Gordon, supra note 163, at 1627–28 (citing S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 64
(1975)).
268. See Fisher, supra note 151, at 1684 (“A question often asked by lower courts
construing the fair use doctrine [has been]; assuming the defendant’s objective was
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In Europe, a similar approach exists within the ambit of the FoE
balancing. 269 One example is the E.Ct.H.R. case of Akdeniz v. Turkey. 270
The case concerned the blocking of access in Turkey to the websites
“myspace.com” and “last.fm” because they were disseminating musical
works in violation of copyright. In dismissing the applicant’s claim that
the blocking amounted to a violation of his right to receive information,
the Court noted, among other things, that the applicant:
[H]ad been deprived of only one means of listening to music among many others.
The Court considers that the applicant could without difficulty have access to
a range of musical works by numerous means without this entailing a breach of copyright
rules. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute that he could at the time of the
contested decision receive such or similar programs by means other than websites.
On this point, the case is barely distinguishable from the . . . Tanrıkulu and
others in which the Court has not recognized as victims the readers of a daily

laudable, could he have achieved it without copying the plaintiff’s copyrighted material?
If so, the courts held the defendant’s invocation of the fair use defense was less
persuasive than it would have been otherwise.”); Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra
note 27, at 2579, 2610 (“An unreasonable refusal to license a use . . . or to license the
use on reasonable terms . . . has sometimes favored fair use;” “The availability of
alternative means to make movies ‘family-friendly’ was a significant factor in defeating
a fair use claim made by a firm that altered actual DVD disks so that ‘harmful’ content
in the movies would not be rendered when the DVD played.”); Gordon, supra note 163,
at 1629 (“In a case where a county educational program was videotaping educational
television programs, the systematic and centralized nature of the copying and the
various market alternatives that were present made license and purchase agreements
quite possible.”).
269. For the discussion of an alternative means factor in the case law of the
E.Ct.H.R. as it concerns alternatives to imparting information, see Mouvement Raëlien
Suisse
v.
Switzerland,
No.
16354/06,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165; Guja v. Moldova, No. 14277/04, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-85016; Appleby and Others v. United
Kingdom, No. 44306/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00161080. On the alternatives to receiving information, see Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, Nos.
48226/10 and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001159188; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, No. 18030/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-167828; Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden,
No. 23883/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90234;
Kalda
v.
Estonia,
No.
17429/10,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160270.
270. Akdeniz v. Turkey, No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-9493. See Geiger & Izyumenko, The Role of
Human Rights in Copyright Enforcement Online, supra note 116, at 49–52 (discussing in detail
Akdeniz v. Turkey).
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newspaper which was banned from distribution. 271

Although the applicant’s claim was dismissed in the circumstances of
this particular case, the Strasbourg Court left open the possibility of
refusing the copyright enforcement in a situation of a lack of legitimate
offerings. In another case on website blocking, by contrast, a violation of
Article 10 E.C.H.R. was established where the measure rendered a
website inaccessible with information of specific interest that was not
otherwise easily available and for which there was no equivalent. 272
Another good example, even if not concerned directly with copyright,
is the case of Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi about the immigrant family
from Iraq discussed above. 273 The Court, having observed first that the
information the family wished to receive covered all types of content,
including pure entertainment, 274 then went on stating that:
[I]t has not been claimed that the applicants had any other means of receiving
these or similar programmes at the time of the impugned decision than
through the use of the satellite installation in question, nor that their satellite
dish could be installed in a different location. They might have been able to
obtain some news through foreign newspapers and radio programmes, but
these sources of information only cover parts of what is available via television
broadcasts and cannot in any way be equated with the latter. Moreover, it has
not been shown that the landlord later installed broadband and internet access
or other alternative means which gave the tenants in the building the
possibility to receive these television programmes. 275

On that basis, the E.Ct.H.R. concluded that the interference with the
271. Akdeniz v. Turkey, No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 25 (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-9493 (emphasis added) (translation by the
authors draws for some parts on the legal summary of the case prepared by the Registry
of the E.Ct.H.R. See Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 173, April 2014);
see also Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom, No. 48876/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 124
(2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244 (finding that restrictions on
access to broadcast media were justified by the availability of information in question
on the Internet and noting that “access to alternative media is key to the proportionality
of a restriction on access to other potentially useful media”).
272. Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 5152 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159188.
273. Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, No. 23883/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90234.
274. Id. at ¶ 44.
275. Id. at ¶ 45.
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applicants’ right to freedom of information was disproportionate to the
landlord’s interest in upholding order and good custom. 276 As a result, it
was held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10
(freedom of expression) E.C.H.R.
Apart from its explicit recognition, there is yet another avenue under
the right to FoE for considering the ease with which the work can be
accessed by the user. In particular, “[t]he nature and severity of the
penalties imposed are also factors to be taken into consideration when
measuring the proportionality of the interference [with freedom of
expression].” 277 By analogy, if we consider proportionality of the FoE use
before the courts decide on the penalties (i.e. when they have to make a
decision on whether the use is fair), the fact that the work was not
accessible (i.e. was out of print; the license was refused) or was not
accessible on reasonable terms (disproportionately high licensing fees; no
attractive business models) can tilt the scales towards a “fair use” finding
just like the disproportionate amount of fines or other penalties imposed
on the applicant often cuts towards a violation of Article 10 E.C.H.R.
Arguably, this is an important benefit of the European “fair use.” The
current copyright framework in the E.U. does not give the courts an
ability to weigh all the interests and improvise a complete set of remedies.
Under the E.U. exceptions framework, there is always a defendant
proving that her use of the accuser’s work fell within one of the
exceptions to copyright. At the same time, the most “fair” use might be
something that the accuser herself is capable of bringing on the
marketplace. 278 In this way, the emphasis on freedom of information,
rights of users, and, more specifically on the “alternative means” factor
opens the way to a broader perspective. Viewed in this light, the
alternative means factor is capable of remedying the current “lack of
276. Id. at ¶¶ 47-49.
277. Leroy v. France, No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88657 (translation from French by the authors);
Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, No. 2034/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103951.
278. Cf. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1237 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(“For loss of potential license revenue to cut against fair use, the evidence must show
that licenses for excerpts of the works at issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced,
and that they offered excerpts in a format which is reasonably convenient for users.” (emphasis
added)); Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 1397.

2019]

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN "FAIR USE"

63

structural incentives for improving access” 279 by partially shifting the
onus on the rightsholders. 280 The latter have in the past preferred
deterrence strategies of enforcement to the introduction of more
attractive alternatives in the marketplace. It must be admitted though,
that no such strategies achieved the expected results, 281 thus clearly
raising the question of their appropriateness and calling for an
examination of possible solutions. The alternative means factor within
the framework of the European “fair use” can serve as one step in this
direction. 282
279. See Rebecca Giblin, When ISPs Become Copyright Police, in 18 IEEE INTERNET
COMPUTING 84–85 (Charles Petrie ed., 2014) (detailing the lack of structural incentives
for improving access of products).
280. See Fred von Lohmann, Legal Dir. for Copyright, Google, Speech at the
Information Influx International Conference of the Institute for Information Law
(IViR); Filtering Away Infringement: Copyright, Injunctions and the Role of ISPs (July
3, 2014) (arguing, in the context of website blocking injunctions against the Internet
access providers, that the current enforcement framework in the E.U. does not allow
the judges to weigh whether the rightholder herself has provided reasonable means of
access to her works before demanding that the “pirate” sites are blocked by the ISPs).
281. See, e.g., id. at 707 (relating to graduated response and certain other enforcement
initiatives); see Geiger & Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright Enforcement
Online, supra note 116, at 46–47, 110–12 (demonstrating that none of the deterrence
strategies for enforcement were successful in relation to website blocking).
282. The negative sides of the alternative means factor should not be overlooked
though, both for the purposes of objective assessment of the European “fair use”
feasibility and to avoid the negative flip-sides inherent, plausibly, in each legal tool,
whether judicial or legislative. Thus, the alternative means factor is often criticized for
its failure to give sufficient consideration to the importance of certain means of
transmission of information. See Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, No. 16354/06,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the existence of alternative means of
communication . . . could not by itself justify the interference with . . . freedom of
expression. The limited scope of the interference does not free the State of the duty to provide a sufficient
reason for it . . . The mere fact that public authorities choose to interfere with a limited
means of communication does not excuse them from having to provide a convincing
argument to support the pressing social need for the interference.” (emphasis in the
original)); see also Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of
Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2013) (discussing
that in the U.S. too, the alternative means factor is criticized at times as favoring the
industries; “it is no secret that the content creation industries served by copyright law
are among the most powerful in the United States, both economically and politically.
There is great awareness of their contribution to the gross domestic product and
economic growth as well as their critical place in the international marketplace. As a
result, when the movie, music, publishing, and software industries bring suits against
alleged infringers, the courts’ emphasis on the alternative means by which the
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F. OTHER FACTORS
1. Amount and Substantiality of Taking
In the United States, amount and substantiality of taking is evaluated
under factor three of the fair use doctrine. 283 Under the FoE balancing,
however, no direct analogue to this factor exists. 284 Nor has it yet been
considered in any of the copyright disputes decided by the E.Ct.H.R. up
to date. The case law does exist, however, in which the amount of
transmitted information was taken into account as a factor in the FoE
analysis outside of the copyright sphere. Such cases concern, notably, the
area of privacy and personal data protection – the sphere that is often
instructive for the resolution of copyright disputes.
In the recent case from June 2017, the E.Ct.H.R. had to address a
complaint of two media companies who had published the data on the
income and assets of around one third of all taxable population of
Finland. 285 The data in question were already a matter of public record in
the country, but the manner and the extent to which that information was
published constituted a problematic issue for the national authorities and
courts. Under Finnish law, although information on the taxable income
and assets of taxpayers is public, its processing is constrained by a
number of limitations set to protect the taxpayers’ privacy. A would-be
data processor is not subject to the majority of such limitations, provided
it is engaged (as was the case, on the surface of things, with the applicant
companies) in journalism. The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland
had found, however, that the journalism derogation did not apply in the
circumstances of the applicants’ case. According to that court:
The term, ‘processing of personal data for journalistic purposes’ cannot be
regarded as covering the large-scale publication of the journalistic background
file, almost verbatim, as catalogues, albeit split into different parts and sorted
defendants can vindicate their free speech interests without impinging on the plaintiffs’
property rights may reflect a certain solicitude towards those industries.”).
283. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1992).
284. See BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
48, at 32–33 (discussing the Court’s use of the three-part test in assessing the inference
of freedom of expression).
285. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, No. 931/13, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175121.
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by municipality. Since the disclosure of registered data on such a scale is
equivalent to the disclosure of the entire background file kept for journalistic
purposes by the company, such disclosure does not represent solely an
expression of information, opinions, or ideas . . . [T]he processing of personal
data collected in the company’s background file by publishing it and by
rendering it available to the general public to the extent that has been done in
the present case . . . cannot be regarded as compatible with the purpose of the
Personal Data Act. 286

The Supreme Court further observed that the preparatory work on the
Personal Data Act made it clear that databases established for journalistic
purposes were not intended to be made available to persons not engaged
in journalistic activities and that journalistic privilege in question thus
related to the processing of data for internal purposes. The E.Ct.H.R.
essentially agreed with this reasoning (by fifteen votes to two), having
held that “the existence of a public interest in providing access to, and
allowing the collection of, large amounts of taxation data did not
necessarily or automatically mean that there was also a public interest in
disseminating en masse such raw data in unaltered form without any
analytical input.” 287 It thus followed, according to the Court, that “the
sole object of the impugned publication was not, as required by domestic
and E.U. law, the disclosure to the public of information, opinions, and
ideas– a conclusion borne out by the layout of the publication, its form,
content, and the extent of the data disclosed.” 288
This conclusion, although not free from possible criticism (as
evidenced notably by the opinion of two dissenting judges on the panel
to this case 289), provides some insights on how the amount of use factor
found in U.S. fair use can be approached from the FoE perspective.
2. Status of the “Speaker”
Unlike within the U.S. fair use doctrine, the status of the user, or
“speaker”, including that of the press, is one of the factors taken in
consideration under the FoE balancing. Although Article 10 (freedom of
286. Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Supreme Administrative Court of Finland) (emphasis added).
287. Id. at ¶ 175.
288. Id. at ¶ 178 (emphasis added).
289. Id. (Sajó, J., and Karakaş, J., dissenting), at ¶ 26 (observing in particular that “it
is a major burden upon journalists to prescribe requirements on the amount of data
they can collect and publish and on the form in which they must publish it, etc.”).
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expression) E.C.H.R. does not explicitly mention the freedom of the
press, the Court has developed extensive case law providing a body of
principles and rules granting the press a special status in the enjoyment
of Article 10 freedoms. 290 Thus, in Lingens v. Austria, the Court stressed
the freedom of the press as a particularly significant aspect of the “right
to receive and impart information and ideas.” 291 Therefore, the most
careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for when the measures
taken or sanctions imposed by the national authorities are capable of
discouraging the participation of the press in the debates over matters of
legitimate public concern. 292
An elevated status accorded to the press under the FoE balancing
mirrors one of the statutory purposes of the U.S. fair use, news reporting,
which also features among the exceptions to copyright listed in Article 5
InfoSoc. 293
Another aspect of the status of the “speaker” factor is the role played
by the user in information transmission, particularly on the Internet.
Unlike the C.J.E.U., the Strasbourg Court distinguishes between “active”
users involved in not only receiving, but also imparting information, and
the so-called “mere” or “simple” users acting as the passive recipients
thereof. 294
This was explained in Cengiz and Others – the case that concerned the
blocking of access to YouTube in Turkey. 295 According to the E.Ct.H.R.,
the answer to the question whether the YouTube user can claim to be a
290. Monica Macovei, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A GUIDE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 11 (2d ed. 2004).
291. Lingens v. Austria, No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 42 (1986),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57523; see also David Harris et al., LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 351 (2d ed. 2009).
292. See Jersild v. Denmark, No. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35 (1994),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57891; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, No.
21980/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 64 (1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58369.
293. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 6, art. 5(3)(c).
294. Akdeniz v. Turkey, No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-9493; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 48226/10
and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159188
(emphasis added).
295. Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159188.
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victim of Article 10 violation in such situation depends, inter alia, on the
manner in which that Internet platform is used. 296 In that particular case
for example, the applicants, through their YouTube accounts, “used the
platform not only to access videos relating to their professional sphere
but also in an active manner, for the purpose of uploading and sharing
files of that nature. The second and third applicants also pointed out that
they had published videos about their academic activities.” 297
Analogously in the case of Yıldırım, a violation of Article 10 was found
in relation to the applicant who had published his academic work and his
views on various topics on the website of which he was, in addition, an
owner himself, and which was blocked in the context of judicial
proceedings wholly unrelated to the applicant. 298 By contrast, in the only
copyright case on website blocking decided by the Strasbourg Court so
far, the E.Ct.H.R. found that the applicant lacked standing on the FoE
grounds because, among others, the use concerned was qualified as
passive. 299 The applicant simply sought to access the “pirate” musicsharing websites, bypassing the payment.
3. Form of Expression
Another criterion generally common to Article 10 analysis (but not to
the U.S. fair use evaluation) is concerned with the form (as opposed to
the content) of expression. The form of expression is protected not only
because it can be essential to, or inseparable from, the content but also
because it is essential for imparting ideas. 300 The point of particular
relevance, in application to copyright law, is the protection of
photographs, films, broadcasts, or similar forms of expression which, by
their mere nature, are inseparable from the content. As the U.K. Court
296. Id. at ¶ 49
297. Id. at ¶ 50.
298. Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, No. 3111/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115705.
299. Akdeniz v. Turkey, No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-9493.
300. See, e.g., Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland, No. 16354/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 (Sajó, J., Lazarova Trajkovska, J., &
Vučinić, J., dissenting) (“The Federal Court’s approach reflects a profound
understanding of the communication process in the age of the internet. The poster is
both an expression of specific content . . . and a medium for additional information to
be found on or via the website.”).
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has stated in Ashdown, 301 with reference to the Strasbourg Court’s
judgment in Fressoz and Roire v. France, 302 “[t]here will be occasions when
it is in the public interest not merely that information should be
published, but that the public should be told the very words used by a
person, notwithstanding that the author enjoys copyright in them. On
occasions, indeed, it is the form and not the content of a document which is
of interest.” 303 According to the E.Ct.H.R. case law, indeed, “it is not [the
Court’s] role to cast judgment on the manner in which individuals choose
to express themselves because Article 10 of the Convention also protects
the form in which ideas are conveyed.” 304
As mentioned, the situations in which the message cannot be
separated from its content are not governed in the United States by fair
use. 305 Under the FoE analysis, by contrast, there is a potential for
addressing these situations.
In many of the national courts’ decisions in Europe, the judges had
particular regard to the form of reporting in a broader context of the
copyright/freedom of expression balancing. 306
In one such case, Utrillo, originating from France, the first-instance
court expressed the view that the integral reproduction of the paintings
in the television broadcast was necessary for the public to get a better
understanding of the exhibition. 307 Even if the judgment was ultimately
301. EWCA (Civ) 1142 ¶¶ 42-44.
302. Fressoz and Roire v. France, No. 29183/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58906.
303. EWCA (Civ) 1142 ¶ 43 (emphasis added); see also Melville B. Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV.
1180, 1197 (1970) (“To the extent that a meaningful democratic dialogue depends upon
access to graphic works generally, including photographs as well as works of art, it must
be said that little is contributed by the idea divorced from its expression.”).
304. Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland, No. 16354/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 10 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 (Sajó, J., Lazarova Trajkovska, J., and
Vučinić, J., dissenting); see also Thoma v. Luxembourg, No. 38432/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45
(2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59363; Oberschlick v. Austria, No.
11662/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57 (1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57716.
305. See also Christopher Kelly, Current Events and Fair Dealing with Photographs: Time
for a Revised Approach, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 242, 260 (2012) (highlighting the difficulties
in giving sufficient weight to FoE when regulating the use of photographs under the
U.K. fair dealing).
306. Id.
307. Tribunal de Grande Instance [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Feb.
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reversed, 308 it is nevertheless noteworthy since it paid a special attention
to the form of reporting. Indeed, it might be difficult to conceive how a
medium like television, working exclusively with images, can inform in
an effective way about an exhibition without showing at least one of the
artist’s paintings. 309
On another occasion, in the U.K. case of Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v.
Yelland, 310 the first-instance court allowed media use of the stills from the
film showing Princess Diana and Dodi Al Fayed just before their deaths.
The judge’s view was that the public interest clearly applied in the context
of “communication of what is essentially information – information
clothed in copyright.” 311 However, the U.K. Court of Appeals rejected
this approach, 312 holding that there was no excuse for using copyrightprotected photographs when the information could have been conveyed
in words without publishing the stills. 313
4. Medium of Expression and the Role of the Internet
Article 10 is applicable “not only to the content of information but
also to the means of transmission or reception since any restriction
imposed on the means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and
impart information.” 314 Accordingly, “the potential impact of the
medium of expression concerned is an important factor in the
consideration of the proportionality of an interference.” 315 The
23, 1999, No. 98/7053 (Fr.).
308. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 13,
2003, Bull. civ. I, No. 01-14385 (Fr.) (reversing the decision of the High Court in Paris
Court of Appeal (Cour d’Appel de Paris), “Utrillo,” 30 May 2001). See Christophe Geiger,
Quotation Right and Fundamental Rights, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPET. L. 716,
718–19 (2004).
309. Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information: A
Complex Relationship, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 38 (Fiona Macmillan ed.,
vol. 5, 2007).
310. Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland [1999] Ch. 4853 at 4854, 4876 (Eng.).
311. Id.
312. Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland [2000] EWCA (Civ) 37, at ¶¶ 37–40.
313. Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 227 (2008).
314. Autronic AG v. Switzerland, No. 12726/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47 (1990),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57630.
315. Murphy v. Ireland, No. 44179/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 69 (2003),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61207.
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Strasbourg Court has acknowledged that the traditional audio-visual
media (television and radio) have a more immediate and powerful effect
than the print media 316 or even the Internet. 317
Nevertheless, expression on the Internet (which is of particular
interest in the context of this article) still attracts particular scrutiny on
the part of the E.Ct.H.R. As noted by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, “[t]he
Internet being a public forum par excellence, the State has a narrow
margin of appreciation with regard to information disseminated through
this medium.” 318 According to the E.Ct.H.R., “[i]n the light of its
accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of
information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the
public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information
in general.” 319 The Court has also observed that “[t]he electronic
network, serving billions of users worldwide, is not and potentially will
never be subject to the same regulations and control [as the printed
media].” 320 This recognition of the Internet’s role in the modern society
is important for copyright law since the gradual amount of copyright
disputes of our days are situated in the digital space.
Considerations as to the role of the Internet also feature in the
proposal of a flexible copyright exception advanced by the Global
316. Jersild v. Denmark, No. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 31 (1994),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57891; Murphy v. Ireland, No. 44179/98, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 74 (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61207; Pedersen and Baadsgaard
v.
Denmark,
No.
49017/99,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶
79
(2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67818; TV Vest AS & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v.
Norway,
No.
21132/05,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶
60
(2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90235; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy,
No. 38433/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 132 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001111399.
317. Animal Defenders Int’l v. the United Kingdom, No. 48876/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 119
(2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244 (“[T]he Court considers coherent
a distinction based on the particular influence of the broadcast media. In particular, the
Court recognises the immediate and powerful effect of the broadcast media, an impact
reinforced by the continuing function of radio and television as familiar sources of
entertainment in the intimacy of the home.”).
318. Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, No. 16354/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J. dissenting).
319. Times Newspapers Ltd. (Nos. 1 and 2) v. United Kingdom, Nos. 3002/03 and
23676/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-91706.
320. Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, No. 33014/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶ 63 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104685.
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Network on Copyright Users’ Rights. 321 The proposal provides as
follows:
In addition to uses specifically authorized by law, any use that promotes
general economic, social, and cultural objectives is not infringing if its
character and extent is appropriate to its purposes and does not unduly
prejudice the legitimate interests of the copyright owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of creators, users, third parties, and the public. 322

It then proceeds to state that the “[d]eterminations that a use is noninfringing pursuant to the above-outlined provision shall be based on an
overall assessment of all relevant considerations, including . . .
considerations such as whether, and the extent to which, the copyrighted
material is . . . used to enable or implement new communications and
information technologies. . . .” 323
It must be noted, however, that alongside the recognition of the
important role played by the Internet in the exercise of freedom of
expression, the case law from Strasbourg also acknowledges a
corresponding “risk of harm posed by content and communications on
the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
freedoms.” 324 “[T]he Court does not lose sight of the ease, scope, and
speed of the dissemination of information on the Internet and the
persistence of the information once disclosed, which may considerably
aggravate the effects of unlawful speech on the Internet compared to
traditional media.” 325

321. Model Flexible Copyright Exception, supra note 143.
322. Id. at art. X.1.
323. Id. at art. X.2.C.1(d); see also Thomas C. Folsom, Defining Cyberspace (Finding Real
Virtue in the Place of Virtual Reality), 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75, 77 (2007)
(suggesting that “legal problems in several fields [including copyright and trademark
law] can be better handled by adding a new factor to the otherwise ordinary analysis in
whichever field is implicated: the nature and place of use”). According to this author,
“[t]he new factor directs a decisionmaker to consider both the general nature and values of
cyberspace (the place of use), and the specific kind of conflict that is occurring among the
users there (the nature of use) as highly relevant factors in assessing the applicability of
familiar legal principles in space.”
324. Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, No. 33014/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶ 63 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104685.
325. Delfi AS v. Estonia, No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 147 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-155105.
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V. CONCLUSION:
A TEXT PROPOSAL FOR A “FAIR USE” CLAUSE
BASED ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BALANCING TO BE
IMPLEMENTED IN E.U. COPYRIGHT LAW
As the above analysis demonstrates, European judicial practice on
fundamental rights application provides for a sufficient list of fairness
factors analogous to what the U.S. courts use when applying their famous
fair use doctrine.
This article examined and systematized these factors, which the
contemporary European case law allows to summarize as follows: 1) the
character of the use, including whether such use is commercial or
transformative (i.e. artistic or furthers an important social goal); 2) the
purpose of use; 3) the nature of information at stake (in the general public
interest or not, and, to a certain extent, the “oldness” of such
information); 4) the degree of interference with the property of
copyright-holder, including whether the fair remuneration was paid; 5)
availability of alternative means of accessing the information; and certain
other factors that less frequently feature in the FoE analysis, including
the status of the “speaker”/user, form, and medium of expression.
Europe currently lacks a clause analogous in openness and flexibility
to the U.S. fair use provision, and the balancing test of FoE has all the
ability to fill this gap. This test makes it possible to build upon existing
European perceptions of “fairness” as well as accepted and improved
methodologies of fundamental rights application instead of importing a
U.S.-style fair use doctrine at the pan-European level or developing
brand new approaches, which would take years for the courts to cultivate.
Consequently, the paper advocates an introduction by the legislature
of an open provision based on the FoE balancing test in the E.U.
copyright framework. 326 Such a FoE-grounded “fair use” would not be
the four-factor test known from U.S. law but would subsist in the
proportionality test. It can further be combined with an already existing
326. Mike Palmedo, The User Rights Database: Measuring the Impact of Copyright Balance,
INFOJUSTICE (Oct. 30, 2017), http://infojustice.org/archives/38981 (commenting on
an economic merit of reflecting on open, fair-use like clauses).
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list of limitations as found currently in Article 5 InfoSoc. One possible
proposal of how such a clause can be worded is presented hereby:
1. Any other proportional use for the purpose of freedom of expression and
information is permitted. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is proportional, the factors to be considered shall include:
a) the character of the use, including whether such use is commercial or
transformative;
b) the purpose of use (in the common interest or not);
c) the nature of the information at stake;
d) the degree of interference with the property of copyright-holder,
including whether the fair remuneration was paid;
e) availability of alternative means of accessing the information; and any
other factor that might be relevant for the circumstances of the case.
2. All factors are considered in an overall assessment. In the case of 1.d, the
payment of a fair remuneration subsequent to the use can re-establish its
proportionality when otherwise freedom of expression and information
would be unduly restricted.

Implementing an open-ended copyright clause in E.U. copyright law
would not only be possible but more transparent than the currently
functioning external limitations to copyright (including fundamental
rights) to which the judges have to recourse in the situation of a lack of
appropriate legislative provision. Furthermore, a codification of the
criteria of the FoE balancing test would ensure a better predictability and
thus an increased legal security with an ensuing harmonizing effect.
Finally, the “fair use” clause grounded in the European human rights
tradition is, by definition, supranational, which is important in view of
the E.U. legislature’s intention of harmonization or even unification of
I.P. laws, 327 particularly significant in the online environment. Such a
clause could also reconcile, in view of the upcoming E.U.’s accession to
327. See, e.g., A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights – Boosting Creativity and
Innovation to Provide Economic Growth, High Quality Jobs and First Class Products and Services
in Europe, at 13–14, COM (2011) 287 final (May 24, 2011).
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the European Convention on Human Rights, 328 the current European
legal framework for intellectual property rights with Europe’s human
rights law obligations.

328. See Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 1(8), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007/C 306/01
(amending Article 6(2) of the T.E.U.); Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system
of the Convention, art. 17, May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. 194 (amending Article 59(2)
E.C.H.R.). Although the C.J.E.U. rejected the latest draft agreement of E.U. accession
to the E.C.H.R., this only delayed the accession, which remains binding on the E.U.; see
Opinion 2/13, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Dec. 18, 2014, at VIII,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62013CV0002&lang1=en&type=TXT&a
ncre=.

